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Modern readers of an article about the relationship between courts and 
agencies might expect the author to focus on ways to rein in the agency. I do 
not take that point of view. My experience and study teaches me that the real 
need is a better understanding of how to rein in the courts. The administrative 
process is designed for the purpose of efficiently delivering government services 
to citizens. Since judicial review is an integral part of this design, it is impor-
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tant that courts confine themselves to a function which best serves the in-
tended purposes of the particular administrative program under review. Courts 
are as responsible as agencies for effective government. 
A judicial review system must coordinate judicial and administrative deci-
sionmaking so as to find the best use for each. The present review system seeks 
to achieve this coordination primarily by following the doctrines of standards 
of review1 and unreviewability.2 These two doctrines incorporate generations 
of thinking and experience about the role of judicial involvement in adminis-
trative action. The doctrines advance congressional consideration of the best 
use of judicial decisionmakers in the administrative process by instructing 
courts on their proper role in reviewing a variety of administrative actions. 
The doctrines guide courts in determining how to contribute to the success of 
an administrative program. 
The strength and success of the administrative process depends on the 
proper application of these two doctrines. If judges cannot or do not apply the 
doctrines of standards of review and unreviewability with meticulous care, the 
judiciary may encroach upon areas reserved for administrative decisionmak-
ing. But many judges reviewing administrative decisions take an extremely 
cavalier attitude towards application of these doctrines. For example, one of 
our best judges once wrote: "[W]here there is no question that the agency has 
acted with procedural impeccability and within the scope of the statutory au-
1. Standards of review describe the degrees of scrutiny courts use in reviewing 
agency actions. The standards range from complete scrutiny to very cursory examina-
tion. D. ROTHSCHILD & C. KOCH, FUNDAMENTALS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 680 {1981). See generally 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
chs. 29, 30 (1958). 
2. The doctrine of unreviewability describes those situations where agency ac-
tion is not reviewable at all. There is a strong presumption in favor of judicial review of 
agency actions. See generally K. DAVIS, supra note I, ch. 31. A court may review a 
final agency action unless there is a persuasive reason to believe that Congress intended 
to preclude judicial review. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). 
While the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982), generally 
favors judicial review, id. § 70l(a) forbids review in two very limited cases: when re-
view is precluded by statute, and when agency action is committed to agency discretion 
by law. See D. RoTHSCHILD & C. KocH, supra note I, at 669. A statute must give 
clear and convincing evidence on its face of intent to withhold judicial review. S. REP. 
No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 275 (1945). Such intent may also be shown by legisla-
tive history. Consumer Fed'n of Am. v. FTC, 515 F.2d 367, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The 
legislative history of section 702(a)(2) suggests that an agency action is unreviewable 
only if it is so committed to agency discretion that judicial review is impossible. S. REP. 
No. 752, supra, at 212. One instance would be where the statute is drawn so broadly 
that in a given case there is no law to apply. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. 
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). Factors such as agency expertise, internal agency 
policy making, and the necessity for informal agency decisionmaking also have been 
suggested as occasionally precluding judicial review. See Bullard v. Webster, 623 F.2d 
1042, 1046 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 907 (1981); Saferstein, 
Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 
HARV. L. REV. 367, 377-95 {1968). 
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thority conferred upon it, judicial review can, if so minded, find great latitude 
to range widely, no matter how the standard of review is articulated."3 This 
attitude is not only lawless, but it ultimately harms the citizens that the courts 
and the agencies were designed to serve.4 
A major cause of this cavalier attitude is the inherent myopia of judicial 
decisionmaking. A judge tends to focus on the particular controversy at hand 
and the best interests of the individual citizen seeking review of an administra-
tive decision. At the same time, the judge's decision affects all the citizens 
served by the administrative program. The natural tendency to focus only on 
the controversy at hand prevents the judge from reconciling the many public 
values and interests represented by the program. In order to avoid the dangers 
of this myopia, the judge is supposed to be guided by the standards of review 
and the doctrine of unreviewability. 
The standards of review and the doctrine of unreviewability guide the 
individual judge in deciding both the individual case and in understanding the 
case in the context of the whole program and the overall administrative pro-
cess. Application of these two doctrines assures the court that its limited vision 
is not leading it to do harm it cannot see.5 The doctrines express the investiga-
tion and intent of Congress as to the best use of the judicial decisionmaker. 
They pass on the experience and learning expressed by the common law sur-
rounding these doctines. Standards of review and unreviewability primarily 
3. McGowan, Book Review, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1015, 1021-22 n.14 (1974) 
(reviewing P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHS-
LER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973)); see also 
Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative 
Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199 (discussing three major reasons for judicial reversal of 
agency decisions: unexplained action, unsustainable reason given for action, or inade-
quate or erroneous findings); Gardner, Federal Courts and Agencies: An Audit of the 
Partnership Books, 15 CoLUM. L. REv. 800, 820 (empirical study revealed that judges 
did not feel limited by standards of judicial review). Justice Frankfurter has accurately 
described the problem: 
A formula for judicial review of administrative action may afford grounds for 
certitude but cannot assure certainty of application. Some scope of judicial 
discretion in applying the formula can be avoided only by falsifying the actual 
process of judging or by using the formula as an instrument of futile casu-
istry. It cannot be too often repeated that judges are not automata. The ulti-
mate reliance for the fair operation of any standard is a judiciary of high 
competence and character and the constant play of an informed professional 
critique upon its work. 
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488-89 (1951); see also FTC v. 
Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 299 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); U.S. DEP'T OF 
JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
90 (1947) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL]. 
4. American judges have been less willing than their British counterparts to 
defer to administrative expertise, particularly in matters of broad social importance. B. 
SCHWARTZ & H. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT 7 (1972). 
5. Cf. J. THURBER, The Admiral on the Wheel, in LET YouR MIND ALONE 
241 (1937). 
186 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
serve to control the judiciary, not to allow the judiciary to control the agency. 
I emphasize that this conclusion derives from the demand of the administra-
tive process that the courts and the agencies coordinate in order to serve the 
public in the best possible way. 
To achieve this coordination, the judiciary must have a clear understand-
ing of how the review system is supposed to work. Many judges are confused 
about how to integrate the overall purposes of the administrative review pro-
cess with their decisionmaking in individual cases. In the hope of increasing 
their understanding of the system, this Article attempts a comprehensive ex-
planation of judicial review of administrative decisions created by the doc-
trines of standards of review and unreviewability. I first explore the meaning 
of the several instructions which the system sends to a judge working in a 
particular administrative program and then explain how a judge can find the 
applicable instruction in a particular case. 
l. THE V ARlO US INSTRUCTIONS 
The review system embodied by the two doctrines of standards of review 
and unreviewability generates several instructions that tell the reviewing court 
what level of confidence it must have in the agency's decision. The system has 
developed workable and identifiable distinctions among these instructions.6 De-
spite judicial protestation,7 these instructions can be and are used in practice. 
The instructions relate to two major categories of decisions: those involv-
ing judgment and those involving discretion. I use the term "judgment" to 
designate those decisions which can be either right or wrong. "Discretion" is 
used to encompass decisions which cannot be judged according to any absolute 
standard and hence are not clearly right or wrong. Review instructions relat-
ing to these two categories differ in kind and must be analyzed separately. The 
review instructions relating to judgment are well developed, though somewhat 
outdated. Therefore, I will consider that aspect of the system first. 
The review system currently uses four distinguishable instructions regard-
ing review of judgment: agreement, reasonableness, arbitrariness, and no re-
view. These instructions tell the court what risk of error the relevant adminis-
trative program can tolerate with respect to a particular type of decision. 
Thus, the instructions tell the court how much confidence it must have that 
the agency is correct before it can uphold the agency. The instructions form a 
6. I use the term "instruction" to refer to the various levels of judicial scrutiny 
allowed in reviewing agency actions, e.g., agreement, reasonableness, arbitrariness, and 
no review. See text accompanying note 8 infra. 
7. Even judges with special competence in administrative law find the stan-
dards of review complicated. See, e.g., Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and 
the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 540 (1974); Improving the Adminis-
trative Process-Time for a New APA?, Panel Discussion Before the National Confer-
ence on Federal Regulation (Sept. 28, 1979) (Hon. H. Leventhal) [hereinafter cited as 
Discussion], reprinted in 32 AD. L. REV. 287, 290 (1980). 
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descending scale; at one end the court is told to demand a relatively high 
probability that the agency is correct, and at the other end the court is told not 
to do any testing for error at all.8 
A. Agreement or De Novo Review 
The first instruction on this scale tells a court to affirm the agency only if 
it agrees with the administrative conclusion either as to the entire administra-
tive decision or some part of it; if not, it tells the court to substitute its own 
judgment. It is often called "de novo review" because it tells the court to make 
its own judgments without in any sense being bound by the administrative 
conclusion. 
On most issues which arise, agreement review is not preferred in the ad-
ministrative process because it builds in an inefficient redundancy. That is, if 
the courts are the superior decisionmakers on a particular issue then they 
should be assigned the sole decisionmaking responsibility, thus circumventing 
agency decisionmaking. But there are issues where judges are clearly superior 
to agencies, such as questions of law, that are nonetheless traditionally sub-
jected to agreement review.9 
Most of the confusion over the agreement instruction revolves around the 
role of judicial factfinding in reviewing administrative decisions. This confu-
sion is unjustified. An instruction to do agreement review of facts tells the 
judge, in essence, that a preponderance of evidence must favor the agency's 
finding of facts if the agency decision is to withstand challenge.10 Hence, as to 
facts, agreement review merely expresses a demand for a preponderance of 
evidence in order to uphold the agency's conclusions. 
Although often used for this purpose, the term "de novo review" is liter-
ally illogical: the court cannot be told both to undertake a de novo finding of 
facts and at the same time remain in a review posture. It is better to think of 
de novo as an instruction to do agreement review on a judicial record domi-
nated by administrative factgathering and factfinding. Since the agency's fac-
tual conclusions must be supported by a preponderance of evidence,11 the 
8. W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 249 (7th ed. 
1979); see also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1049 
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (McGowan, J.) (word formulas summon "an attitude of mind in the 
reveiwing court"); Schotland, Scope of Review of Administrative Action-Remarks 
Before the D.C. Circuit Judicial Conference, 34 FED. B. Ass'N J. 54, 59 (1975) (term-
ing the various standards "mood points"). 
9. After exploring the meaning of each instruction, I will return in Section III 
to the question of which issues should be subjected to agreement review. 
10. See Goodman v. United States, 518 F.2d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 1975). 
I I. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981). The preponderance of evidence 
standard is contemplated by the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 555(c) (1982), as well as by tradi-
tional civil and administrative proceedings. Sea Island Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 627 
F.2d 240, 242-44 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Regulatory reform may ultimately impose a pre-
ponderance standard of review in some forms of agency action. See Discussion, supra 
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agreement review instruction merely tells the court to test that preponderance. 
It rarely tells the court to create a redundant record.12 The phrase "de novo 
review" does not demand a judicial retrial of factual issues or even extensive 
judicial recordmaking.13 Rather, the agency record is the focal point. Under 
agreement review of facts, the administrative record becomes an object of at-
tack along with the agency's final decision. The challenger, like any other 
plaintiff, must show by a preponderance of evidence that the agency decision is 
wrong.14 In doing so, the challenger may introduce into the judicial record 
other evidence or request new or different inferences 'from the administative 
record. This position of the administrative record in the judicial proceeding is 
unique among the instructions. Thus the term "de novo" review tells the court 
to do agreement review of facts on a judicial record, some or all of which is 
the original administrative record; agreement as to factual judgments will re-
sult when a preponderance does not support the challenger's view of the facts. 
Agreement review might apply to any of the issues that make up a com-
plete administrative decision. It is rarely used to review issues of fact, however, 
and virtually never applied to issues of policy.15 Agreement review as to these 
issues has substantial costs that are rarely outweighed by its potential benefits. 
By its nature, agreement review builds redundancy into an administrative pro-
gram. Redundancy, however, has both bad and good implications. 
On one hand, agreement review creates wasteful inefficiency and misal-
location of decisionmaking resources. Remaking the decision has considerable 
costs, and these costs increase when the second decisionmaker could just as 
easily have made the decision in the first instance. Not only might agreement 
review make a competent administrative decision superfluous, but it might re-
place a superior decision with an inferior one. An agency should be designed 
with particular types of potential decisions in mind; as to these decisions the 
note 7 (R. Wegman), reprinted in 32 Ao. L. REv. at 300-01. 
12. United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967): 
It is argued that the use of the word "review" rather than "trial" indicates a 
more limited scope to judicial action. The words ... might conceivably be 
used interchangeably. The critical words seem to us to be "de novo" and "is-
sues presented." They mean to us that the Court should make an independent 
determination of the issues. 
The U.S. Code contains 30 sections authorizing de novo judicial consideration; 14 refer 
to "review" and 16 refer to "trial." Only 13 of these 30 sections involve review of 
administrative action. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1320f (1976) (authorizes use of agency 
record in de novo proceeding before the district court). 
13. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 652-53 (1965). 
14. Goodman v. United States, 518 F.2d 505, 507 (5th Cir. 1975); Redmond v. 
United States, 507 F.2d 1007, 101 I (5th Cir. 1975). "Preponderance" becomes impor· 
tant because the judicial proceeding theoretically ignores the agency decision; the term 
articulates the weight of information that is necessary to support the agency. 
15. Courts reviewing administrative action generally are not authorized to sub-
stitute judgment on issues ot fact and policy. See ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 
1153, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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agency should be the superior decisionmaker.16 Moreover, the agency usually 
has the time and machinery for more sophisticated and eclectic decisions. 
Such advantages are particularly likely to exist with respect to issues of fact 
and policy. 
On the other hand, agreement review polices the administrative deci-
sionmakers more thoroughly than other review instructions. It compels strong 
checks, useful reanalysis, and administrative introspection. It might also have 
advantages in situations where ~second decisionmaker with a new perspective 
can substantially improve the results of the first decisionmaker. The reviewing 
court will have the benefit of the administrative decision and can improve that 
decision from a position of objectivity. In addition, the prospect of agreement 
review may make the agency more careful in its decisions because it faces the 
prospect that it may have to prove it is right. Thus, there is nothing inherently 
wrong with agreement review, and the review system must contain such an 
instruction. 
The current judicial review system would be improved, however, by a 
more sophisticated use of the agreement instruction. The instruction should 
only be used where the costs of use are outweighed by the benefits. Costs at-
tributable to duplication, and the commitment of judicial resources, are con-
siderable, and inhibit a program's ability to deliver intended services. Agree-
ment review should only be prescribed where the advantages of redundancy 
outweigh these costs. Congress should carefully weigh these factors before it 
incorporates agreement review into an administrative program. Courts, on the 
other hand, should not infer such authority unless it is expressly granted, and 
they should limit the exercise of expressed authority to those parts of the deci-
sion for which it was clearly intended. 
The common law principles surrounding agreement or de novo review 
guard against unnecessary costs through the concepts of deference and pre-
sumption of regularity. Even where agreement review is prescribed, the law 
requires the reviewing court to give deference to agency decisionmaking.17 The 
law also requires the court to start from the presumption that the agency 
made the correct decision.18 Thus, although the other review instructions bind 
a court to the agency's judgment unless it is unreasonable or arbitrary, agree-
ment review, while not going that far, still demands that the court give the 
agency's decision due respect and presumption of regularity. 
In performing agreement review, the court may uphold the agency only 
where it finds after reviewing the administrative record, and any supplemental 
judicial record, that the agency is correct. When the instruction covers factual 
16. See W. GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN vii, 1-2 (1966). Nonethe-
less, the forces on agency action support independent supervision. See Posner, Natural 
Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548, 624-25 {1969). 
17. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 {1976). 
18. See Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 367 
u.s. 396, 408 (1961). 
190 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
issues, it will affirm the agency's conclusions only where a preponderance of its 
record supports the agency. In order to guard against unnecessary costs, a 
court will usually afford the agency decision both deference and a presumption 
of regularity.19 In short, a court applying this instruction is under a duty to 
give deference or respect, but it is in no way bound by the agency's judgment. 
B. Reasonableness 
Reasonableness review differs fundamentally from agreement review be-
cause, in contrast, it binds the court to the agency's conclusion unless the court 
finds the conclusion to be unreasonable. Reasonableness review instructs the 
court that it need not delve so deeply into the agency's judgment so as to 
assure that the conclusion is correct; it tells the court to assure that there is a 
relatively high probability that the agency is correct. The reasonableness in-
struction, then, tells the court to tolerate some risk of error (error being a 
conclusion other than the one the court would have reached). 
Reasonableness review expresses the attitude or mood with which a judge 
must approach a particular administrative decision. Whereas agreement re-
view expresses a mood of judicial superiority, "reasonableness" instructs a 
court to approach its function with much less confidence. The reasonableness 
instruction tells the court that it is not to decide whether the agency found the 
one right answer-the answer the judge would have given-or even to deter-
mine how close the agency came to the one right answer. It requires only that 
the court decide whether the agency has found an answer which might be 
correct. The court's function then ends and it is the agency's judgment, not the 
court's, which is controlling. Thus, the court must find that the decision dem-
onstrates sound judgment-not necessarily correct judgment. Sound judgment, 
however, is a fairly sturdy standard, and the mere chance that the agency's 
judgment is correct is not enough. Reasonableness review demands that the 
probability that the agency is correct be relatively high. 
The reasonableness instruction is often expressed by the term "substantial 
evidence." This word formula has been defined in many ways,20 but it gener-
ally generates reasonableness review. The basic substantial evidence standard 
was well established long before the enactment of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA), which did little more than codify existing practice.:n Before 
the APA, the phrase had already acquired the meaning of reasonableness. The 
19. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 
(1971). 
20. A Lexis search found 21,326 federal cases using "substantial evidence," 
11,153 cases controlling for administrative related opinions since the passage of the 
APA. Many of these cases have cited at least one of the classic opinions discussed 
above. The conclusions of this Article are based on cases in this survey, especially the 
opinions of judges known for their expertise in administrative law. 
21. 5 U.S.C. § 706(a)(1)(E) (1982); see a/so MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT, § 5-116(c)(7) (1981), 14 U.L.A. 156 (Supp. 1984) (substantial evi-
dence standard). 
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Supreme Court in an early leading case said that substantial evidence "must 
be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict 
when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury."22 
In order to meet this test, the Supreme Court has required "such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclu-
sion."23 This support is something less than weight or preponderance of the 
evidence.24 While some have offered other definitions,25 reasonableness seems 
to sum up the law and proves to be the most pervasive and useful guide to 
substantial evidence review.28 
Reasonableness review is appropriate any time an administrative program 
requires a high probability of correctness, but it cannot tolerate judicial dupli-
cation of administrative decisionmaking. This combination traditionally exists 
when the decision is made through a formal, trial-like proceeding.27 The domi-
nant issues in such proceedings tend to be specific or adjudication facts; such 
facts can be proven and can be evaluated under a very high correctness stan-
dard. The system cannot tolerate a very high risk of error on such issues, yet it 
gains little from having a court duplicate the agency decisionmaking. Thus, 
the APA provides for reasonableness review-the substantial evidence stan-
dard-only where an administrative decision must be made through the trial-
type procedures of formal adjudication or formal rulemaking.28 
22. NLRB v. Columbia Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 {1939). 
23. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated 
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 {1938)). Consolidated, decided before the 
APA was passed, stated that substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla." 305 U.S. 
at 229. This phrase suggests the "some evidence" approach rejected by the APA 
drafter's "whole record" requirement. See MANUAL, supra note 3, at 110. 
24. Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). 
25. E.g., Jaffe, Judicial Review: Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record, 64 
HARV. L. REV. 1233, 1239 {1951): 
[U]nderlying the vexed word "substantial" is the notion or sense of fair-
ness .... [T]his seems to me to give it a closer linquistic connection with the 
notion of conscientiousness. The word "substantial," coming as it does from a 
spectrum of words such as "scintilla," "preponderance" and "weight," con-
notes the mechanics of judging. The concept of fairness relates to the attitude 
of judging. [T]he judge may-indeed must-reverse if as he conscientiously 
sees it the finding is not fairly supported by the record; or to phrase it more 
sharply, the judge must reverse if he cannot conscientiously escape the conclu-
sion that the finding is unfair. 
This standard of unfairness seems incorrect because it substitutes judicial discretion for 
administrative discretion. Thus, it is more intrusive than a substitution of judicial judg-
ment. While a court may review administrative judgment and sometimes even substi-
tute its judgment, it should not substitute discretion. See section III infra. 
26. In Universal Camera Co. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), the seminal post-
APA case, Justice Frankfurter indisputably established the reasonableness notion for 
applying the substantial evidence standard, and reaffirmed the understanding th:tt the 
APA requires whole rerArd review rather than review for evidence somewhere in the 
record. /d. at 488-90; see S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 214, 279 {1946). 
27. See text accompanying note 165 infra. 
28. 5 U.S.C. § 706{2)(E) (1982); see id. §§ 556-557. 
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The reasonableness instruction may be appropriate for issues or entire de-
cisions resolved in informal adjudication.29 If a court sees reasonableness re-
view as a message to demand a relatively high probability of correctness then 
it can, as we shall see in section III, apply the instruction without regard to 
the context in which the agency made the decision. This flexibility is important 
because substantial evidence review has recently been demanded in decisions 
made through informal procedures. Such instruction has resulted in confusion 
over whether "evidence" is required to meet the test. If evidence is required, 
then the informality of the decisionmaking decreases the likelihood of with-
standing judicial scrutiny. It is clear, however, that use of the term "substan-
tial evidence" is an effort to raise the level of judicial scrutiny, and not to 
define the decisionmaking process. Any confusion could be alleviated by using 
the non-record-laden term, "reasonableness." A simple instruction to do rea-
sonableness review would better express the intended relationship between the 
courts and the agency in an administrative program. In this way, as I discuss 
in section III, this higher review might be applied to any kind of issue decided 
through any form of procedure. 
Much of the meaning of the reasonableness instruction derives from expe-
rience and commentary on the application of the substantial evidence test. 
Again, however, very little flexibility is required to transfer this learning to 
cases involving reasonableness review of nonformal proceedings; cases review-
ing for substantial evidence in a trial-like proceeding can be used to guide 
review for reasonableness in nontrial-like proceedings. 
Because substantial evidence review is traditionally applied to trial-like 
records, it has naturally been contrasted with the clearly erroneous standard. 
Appellate courts routinely apply the clearly erroneous standard to factual con-
clusions of trial courts. Many believe the standard is appropriate for review of 
agency decisions made through trial-like procedures,30 but it is not so used. 
The classic formulation of the clearly erroneous standard is expressed in 
United States v. Gypsum Co.31: 
Since judicial review of findings of trial courts does not have the statutory or 
constitutional limitations on judicial review of findings by administrative 
agencies or by a jury, this Court may reverse findings of fact by a trial court 
where "clearly erroneous." 
The practice in equity prior to the present Rules of Civil Procedure was 
29. "The term 'informal adjudication' has no commonly accepted mean-
ing .... [l]t broadly refers to administrative decisions that are not governed by statu-
tory procedures, but which nevertheless affect an individual's rights, obligations, or op-
portunities." Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudiciation Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 739, 739 n.1 (1976). 
30. Compare MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, § 5-116(c)(7) 
(1981), 14 U.L.A. 156 (Supp. 1984) with MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
ACT, § 15(g)(5) (1961), 14 U.L.A. 431 (1980)(the new Act uses the substantial evi-
dence test, whereas the old Act used the clearly erroneous standard). 
31. 333 u.s. 364 (1947). 
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that the findings of the trial court, when dependent upon oral testimony where 
the candor and credibility of the witnesses would best be judged, had great 
weight with the appellate court. The findings were never conclusive, however. 
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to support it, 
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.32 
193 
As explained in Gypsum, the clearly erroneous standard instructs the review-
ing authority to assure that the inferior authority has not made a mistake, i.e., 
that it has found the correct answer. 
The clearly erroneous standard and the de novo standard are similar be-
cause they both require some degree of agreement. Both instruct the reviewing 
authority to assure that the inferior authority has found the one right answer. 
They differ only in the level of confidence the superior authority must have 
that the inferior authority has the right answer. In the strong form of agree-
ment review, expressed most often by the de novo standard, the review author-
ity can decide that a mistake was made where a preponderance of evidence did 
not support the inferior authority's conclusions. In the weak form of agree-
ment, expressed by the clearly erroneous standard, the review authority would 
have to find that the mistake was clear on the inferior authority's record. 
Thus, these two terms express essentially the same judicial attitude. They 
differ in the extent to which the review authority may look beyond the inferior 
authority's record and, more importantly, in the degree of persuasion it should 
require. De novo review requires that the court be persuaded that the inferior 
authority is correct, whereas the word "clearly" suggests a fairly strong pre-
sumption in favor of the inferior authority. Hence, the review authority cannot 
reject the inferior authority's conclusions merely on a finding that there is 
more support for the conclusion that a mistake was made. The review author-
ity must uphold the inferior authority under the clearly erroneous standard 
unless it is affirmatively convinced that a mistake has been made.33 Thus, if 
clearly erroneous review were applied to judicial review of agency action, the 
review system would have two types of agreement review instruction: a strong 
and a weak agreement review. 
The present administrative review system does not use the clearly errone-
ous standard/weak form of agreement review. Either the court is instructed to 
rely on its own record, perhaps dominated by the agency's record, and reverse 
unless the agency has found the right answer, or it is instructed to rely on the 
agency's record and assure that the agency has found an answer which might 
be correct. The absence of a "clearly erroneous" standard from the present 
system means that a reviewing court cannot be told to use the agency's record 
and uphold the agency unless it is convinced that the agency has not found the 
right answer.34 Moreover, the strong form of agreement review is rarely pre-
32. /d. at 395 (footnotes omitted). 
33. See L. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 572. 
34. I iiiustrate the difference between "clearly erroneous" and "substantial evi-
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scribed. As discussed above, agreement review in any form is not preferred in 
the administrative process and it plays only a small part in the judicial review 
system. 
Some have argued, however, that the clearly erroneous standard should 
be used instead of the substantial evidence or reasonableness standard.3G These 
people are not confident in administrative decisionmakers and want a more 
active judiciary in the administrative process. The weak form of agreement 
review established by the clearly erroneous test comports with their view of the 
proper relationship between the courts and the agencies. Although some have 
doubted the practical difference between the two,36 others have recognized 
that the difference runs to the foundation of the judiciary's role in the admin-
istrative process. 37 Those who debate over the imposition of the clearly errone-
ous standard understand that it assigns to the courts a very active role in ad-
ministrative decisionmaking. They see that, whereas reasonableness review 
limits the judicial role to assuring that the agency has stayed within some 
rather broad boundaries, the clearly erroneous standard forces the courts to 
take an active part in the administrative process. Advocates of the weak form 
of agreement review, therefore, want the judiciary to have affirmative decision-
making duties and not merely monitor the agency's decisionmaking.38 They 
prefer the clearly erroneous standard over the stronger form of agreement re-
view because it affords the agency's decision a stronger presumption of cor-
rectness, and judicial judgment can be made on the administrative record 
without any argument that a judicial record is needed. 
Opponents of the weak form of agreement review see advantage in leav-
ing the actual decisionmaking in the hands of the agency under the supervision 
of the courts and see the monitoring role as more consistent with the concept 
of an administrative process. They see the hierarchical relationship between 
courts in the judicial process as fundamentally different from the relationship 
between courts and agencies. Agencies are distinct entities in their own sys-
tem, and while courts should monitor their conduct, they should not stand as a 
superior authority in the same way that appellate courts stand to lower courts. 
To them, the pervasive establishment of an active role for the judiciary in the 
dence" for my students through the following question. "If a professor says that he 
expects the 'right' answer in an examination, has he required more than if he says he 
will give full credit for a 'reasonable' answer, even if it is not the correct one?" 
35. B. ScHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 600 (1976); Special Committee on 
Legal Services and Procedures, ABA, Report to the Midyear Meeting of the House of 
Delegates 31-32 (1956). 
36. S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1941); L. JAFFEE, supra note 13, 
at 92. 
37. 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 124-25; B. ScHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 596. 
38. In challenging an agency's judgment, the clearly erroneous standard (the 
agency was incorrect) at first seems to be more difficult to overcome than a reasonable-
ness standard (the agency was unreasonable). This attitude ignores the nature of the 
judicial function, which focuses on the adequacy of the agency action rather than the 
adequacy of the challenge. 
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administrative process would injure the integrity of both systems and detract 
from the advantages of using administrative decisionmaking in the first place. 
This view has prevailed, and the clearly erroneous standard is not used in the 
administrative process. 
The system thus has a sharp break between the active role conveyed by 
strong agreement review and the monitoring role conveyed by reasonableness 
review. The system has not accepted a weak agreement review, expressed as 
clearly erroneous, either as a substitute for reasonableness review or as an 
intermediary instruction. Indeed, the system has generally rejected any form 
of agreement review on most issues as inconsistent with the relationship be-
tween the courts and the agencies in the administrative process. In sum, rea-
sonableness is one of the most pervasive instructions in the administrative pro-
cess.39 Reasonableness, although not a search for the one correct answer, does 
instruct the judge to assure that there is a relatively high probability that the 
agency's judgment is correct; it is tolerant of some risk of error but demands a 
relatively critical attitude on the part of the reviewing court. 
C. Arbitrariness 
The review system must provide for administrative decisions which are by 
nature incapable of standing up to a very critical judicial attitude. As to such 
decisions, it must tolerate a fairly high risk of error or the decisions could 
never pass judicial scrutiny. For this reason, the system has developed the "ar-
bitrary or capricious" standard, or simply arbitrariness.40 Arbitrariness review 
is similar in some ways to reasonableness review. Both tell the court to monitor 
the agency for probability of correctness. They differ, however, in the degree 
of judicial scrutiny; the arbitrariness instruction tests for a much lower 
probability of correctness and builds into an administrative program a greater 
tolerance for error. 
Beyond its contrast with reasonableness review, there is no clear meaning 
for arbitrariness review. Courts have tried on occasion to articulate some for-
mulation for the arbitrariness standard. Since 1971, courts have looked to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe41 
for guidance in the application of the arbitrariness standard. Overton Park 
involved an informal adjudication by the Secretary of Transportation to free 
federal funds for the construction of a highway through Overton Park in 
Memphis, Tennessee. Under section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation 
39. See 4 K. DAVIS, supra note I, at 114. 
40. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1982) authorizes three separate types of re-
view: arbitrary or capricious; abuse of discretion; and not in accordance with law. 
Capriciousness seems to be a lesser included element of arbitrariness, or action made 
arbitrary because it is based solely on whim. Abuse of discretion refers not to review of 
true discretion, but weak review of judgments and thus often mirrors review for arbi-
trariness. Review of law is distinct. See section III infra. 
41. 401 u.s. 402 (1971). 
196 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
Act42 and section 138 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act,43 the Secretary of 
Transportation could not authorize use of federal funds to finance construction 
of highways through public parks if a "feasible and prudent" alternative r~ute 
existed.44 The petitioners, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, contended that 
the Secretary violated these statutes by authorizing a six-lane interstate high-
way through the park. 
After the Court found the action reviewable, it then had to prescribe the 
appropriate standard of review for such informal decisionmaking procedures. 
The Court found no compelling need for independent judicial factfinding and 
thus no cause to require de novo review.•5 It then held that the absence of a 
formal hearing requirement eliminated a requirement of substantial evidence 
review.46 Although neither strict standard applied, the Court determined that 
"the generally applicable standard of [APA] § 706 requires the reviewing 
court to engage in a substantial inquiry" and the presumption of regularity "is 
not to shield [the Secretary's] action from a thorough, probing, in-depth re-
view."•7 Nonetheless, within this "substantial inquiry," if the official acted 
within his authority, then the court is to ensure against only arbitrariness. "To 
make this finding the court must consider whether the decision was based on a 
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error 
of judgment. . . . Although the inquiry into the facts is to be searching and 
careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one."48 
Although this formulation of the arbitrariness instruction is often cited, it 
is hardly useful. Indeed, if taken literally, if is simply wrong. In the first place, 
courts applying this formulation tend to ignore all but the mandate to conduct 
a searching and careful inquiry; they slip into a more active role than was 
intended for arbitrariness review. They tend to forget the counterpoise admon-
ishment in the Supreme Court's formulation that the standard is a narrow one. 
Whereas under the arbitrariness instruction the reviewing court is to inquire 
closely into the administrative record and the circumstances surrounding the 
decision, the court must measure the decision itself under a standard which 
allows the court to reverse only if it finds that the risk of error is extremely 
42. 49 u.s.c. § 1653(f) (1976). 
43. 23 u.s.c. § 138 (1982). 
44. 401 U.S. at 41 I. 
45. Id. at 414. 
46. Id. at 414-15. In dicta, the Court stated that rulemaking covered by 5 
U.S.C. § 553 (1982) is subject to review for substantial evidence. 401 U.S. at 417. The 
Court either erred in reading the APA, or it was referring to the formal rulemaking 
requirement incorporated _by reference in § 553. Section 553 refers to §§ 556-551 for 
"on the record" or formal rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982) prescribes substantial 
evidence review for formal rulemaking. See National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Wein-
berger, 512 F.2d 688, 700-01 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975). But see 
Note, Judicial Review of the Facts in Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed Standard, 84 
YALE L.J. 1750, 1756-58 (1975). 
47. 401 U.S. at 415. 
48. Id. at 416. 
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high. The Supreme Court's formulation, however, leads courts to undertake an 
in-depth inquiry and to evaluate the decision very critically. The first is essen-
tial, but the second is totally incompatible with the logic of the review system. 
The Court contributed further to the confusion by telling courts to mea-
sure the decision for "clear error of judgment."49 This tells the reviewing court 
to look for mistake instead of measuring the risk of error; it incorporates 
agreement review into the arbitrariness standard. The Overton Park Court's 
formulation would require a court doing arbitrariness review to evaluate the 
administrative decision under the same standard as would be required by the 
clearly erroneous standard; the court would reverse if it was affirmatively con-
vinced that an error had been made. 
The Court in Overton Park seemed to recognize that the arbitrariness 
instruction establishes a much less active judicial role, but its choice of words 
misdirects courts toward the more active participation engendered by agree-
ment review. As a matter of fact, the case was a prime example of when a 
court should not hold an agency's decision to a very high probability of cor-
rectness. Any judgment on what is "feasible and prudent" must be, by its 
nature, very flimsy. Were a court to do more than arbitrariness review it 
would almost inevitably replace the administrative decisionmaker. Since these 
are the judgments that agencies were created to make, substituting judicial 
decisions would divert the decisionmaking authority into the hands of the 
wrong institution. For such decisions the courts must carefully remain a toler-
ant monitor, because the arbitrariness instruction dictates and communicates 
restraint. By encouraging courts to stray beyond this role, the Supreme 
Court's decision in Overton Park has added confusion, not clarity, to the re-
view system. Go 
Refinement of the "arbitrariness" standard has not succeeded because the 
word itself carries all the meaning needed. The word emerged through the 
evolution of administrative law principles and was adopted by the APA draft-
ers.G1 It has not been improved upon and, in fact, efforts such as Overton Park 
have, to varying extents, detracted from the system's ability to communicate. 
The meaning of the arbitrariness standard starts with an understanding of 
the term in ordinary usage. In ordinary speech, "arbitrary" is used differently 
from "unreasonable." As Professor Jaffe has suggested, reasonableness con-
49. !d.; see Wright, The Courts and Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judi-
cial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 392 n.84 (1974). 
50. It has been suggested that Overton Park sought to consolidate arbitrariness 
review with review for constitutionality, jurisdiction, and procedure. Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. NRC, 685 F.2d 459, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), 
rev'd sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 103 
S. Ct. 2246 (1983). Although this observation makes more sense than what Overton 
Park held, it is not supported by the opinion or sound judicial policy. Because each of 
these categories raises a different level of review, they must be separated as they ap-
pear in administrative decisions. See section III infra. 
51. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). 
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notes the operation of a reasoning mind. 52 Hence, unreasonableness is a result 
that cannot be the product of a reasoning mind. For a decision to fail this test, 
it must compel an affirmative conclusion that the decision could not be the 
product of a valid reasoning process. This allows for a variety of possible an-
swers, but requires that each alternative must be clearly within the boundaries 
of sound judgment. Arbitrariness, on the other hand, sets a much lower 
threshold. It conveys the sense that the decision is totally intolerable; it rejects 
only those decisions that are outside any conceivable rationale alternative. I 
suggest that an arbitrary decision would be one expected of a psychotic, a 
despot, a primitive, or the like. Evaluating the decision in this way demands 
much less critical depth than measuring it against the product of a reasoning 
mind. In somewhat more concrete terms, the difference is one of measuring 
the probability of error. Arbitrariness demands a much lower probability that 
the administrative judgment is correct than either reasonableness or agree-
ment review.53 · 
The ordinary meaning of "arbitrary" conveys the lower critical evaluation 
demanded of the reviewing court and the sense that the court should be very 
tolerant unless the judgment is beyond all boundaries of acceptability. A court 
which does not recognize the difference between this instruction and others 
denies those subtle distinctions that allow for sophisticated communication. 
While it is useless to try to quantify the arbitrariness standard,54 a review 
of the cases suggests that the courts, despite their protests, understand the 
nature of the instruction.55 While judges do not attempt to articulate the 
amount of certainty that will convince them to uphold the agency, they have, 
on several occasions, tried to identify facts upon which they make their judg-
ments. For example, Judge McGowan said: 
In short, the concept of "arbitrary and capricious" review defies generalized 
application and demands, instead, close attention to the nature of the particu-
lar problem faced by the agency. The stringency of our review, in a given 
case, depends upon analysis of a number of factors, including the intent of 
Congress, as expressed in the relevant statutes, particularly the agency's ena-
bling statute; the needs, expertise, and impartiality of the agency as regards 
the issue presented; and the ability of the court effectively to evaluate the 
52. L. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 596. 
53. To bring this difference home to my students, I continue the question begun 
in note 33 supra. "If the professor says he will give full credit on an examination for 
answers that are not arbitrary as well as those that are reasonable and correct, would 
you feel more confident on test day?" 
54. Cf. A. FLEW, THINKING ABOUT THINKING 104 {1975) ("As Edmund 
Burke once said, with his usual good sense, 'Though no man can draw a stroke between 
the confines of night and day, still light and darkness are on the whole tolerably 
distinguishable.' "). 
55. A Lexis search revealed 6,764 federal cases using the phrase "arbitrary or 
capricious." The generalization about this standard depends on a survey of these cases, 
especially those decided recently and by judges known for their administrative law 
expertise. 
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question posed.M 
Courts are particularly prone to find a lack of consistency as evidence of arbi-
trariness. 57 In particular, it is often held that an unexplained change in policy 
is arbitrary.58 Courts are also sensitive to a failure to demonstrate considera-
tion of all significant alternatives.59 Indeed, evidence that the. agency might 
have ignored facts, or did not make a good faith effort to gather or consider 
significant information, may lead to a finding of arbitrari:riess.60 "Before ad-
ministrative action will be set aside as arbitrary and capricious, the party chal-
lenging the action must prove that it was willful and unreasoning action, with-
out consideration and in disregard of the facts and circumstances of the 
case."61 
The way the agency goes about gathering the facts may also be consid-
ered arbitrary. Improper methodology and test procedures, for example, have 
been held to create evidence of arbitrary agency factfinding.62 Not only will 
ignoring facts cause problems, but failure to make use of experience or to 
conduct necessary tests or experiments might also rise to the level of arbitrari-
ness.63 In each of these efforts to apply the arbitrariness instruction, the court 
shows the proper cautiousness towards its own function and looks at factors 
which raise an intolerable risk of error. One can glean· from these factors, as 
well as from direct statements, that reviewing courts do in fact understand not 
only the nature of arbitrariness review but also the level of judicial scrutiny 
authorized by instructions to undertake such review. 
In 1983, the Supreme Court decided two cases that will have a lasting 
impact on the scope and interpretation of the arbitrariness standard: Balti-
56. Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1050 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979). 
57. See Catholic Medical Center v. NLRB, 589 F.2d 1166, 1174 (2d Cir. 
1978). 
58. See, e.g., Local No. 777 v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
59. Although there need be no evidence that the agency considered all possible 
choices, failure to adequately consider all significant alternatives may make the agency 
action arbitrary. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095, 
1112-13 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978). 
60. In military personnel decisions, for example, "[t]he touchstone often used is 
whether the decision had any 'basis in fact.'" Nicholson v. Brown, 599 F.2d 639, 646 
(5th Cir. 1979). "A searching and careful inquiry" might determine whether there was 
"a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." Seatrain Int'l v. 
FMC, 598 F.2d 289, 292-93 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Under an arbitrary or capriciousness 
standard, the court must determine whether the agency "properly identified the oppos-
ing interests in light of the facts of record, and rationally balanced them against each 
other." Food Mktg. Inst. v. ICC, 587 F.2d 1285, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
61. Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533, 539 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
927 (1979). Not every "reasoned" decision, however, will pass the test. 
62. See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 662, 665 (1st Cir. 1974). 
63. See ITT-World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 897, 909-10 (2d 
Cir. 1979); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 250 (2d 
Cir. 1977). Experimental regulation, however, should be encouraged and not labeled as 
arbitrary per se. 
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more Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Ver-
mont Yankee I/)64 and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, Inc. v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.611 It is useful to contrast these 
two cases because the former did not find arbitrariness in the agency's action, 
but the latter did. More interestingly, while affirming the D.C. Circuit's find-
ing of arbitrariness in the Motor Vehicle case, the Court took pains to instruct 
the circuit court on its errors in the use of that standard. 
Baltimore Gas involved substantive review of a nuclear waste rule that 
was found to pass procedural muster in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Counci/.66 The controversy revolved around a 
table promulgated by the NRC that purported to evaluate the environmental 
effects of a nuclear power plant's fuel cycle. A public interest organization 
contended that the NRC did not have sufficient basis for using a "zero-release 
assumption," i.e., that solidified wa~te would not escape and harm the environ-
ment once a waste repository was sealed. After taking the now traditional 
swipe at the D.C. Circuit,67 the Court explained that the mere absence of 
certainty did not necessarily make the agency action arbitrary. In this situa-
tion, the NRC recognized the inherent uncertainty in such determination and 
tried to control it in several ways. First, it carefully limited the purpose of the 
zero-release assumption to individual license decisions under current technol-
ogy. Second, the zero-release item in the table constitutes only one of several 
factors which go into individual decisions, and the table as a whole is con-
sciously conservative and "risk averse."68 Third, the Court said "a reviewing 
court must remember that the Commission is making predictions, within its 
area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science. When examining this kind 
of scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing 
court must generally be at its most deferential."69 The Court noted the tre-
mendous volume of information and study supporting the agency's choice, and 
the Commission strongly expressed commitment to risk averseness. It also 
noted the absence of evidence that health or other considerations had ever 
been ignored by the NRC. 
In sum, we think that the zero-release assumption-a policy judgment con-
cerning one line in a conservative Table designed for the limited purpose of 
individual licensing decisions-is within the bounds of reasoned decisionmak-
ing. It is not our task to determine what decision we, as Commissioners, 
would have reached. Our only task is to determine whether the Commission 
64. 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983). 
65. 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983). 
66. 435 U.S. 519 (1978); see notes 270-74 and accompanying text infra. 
67. 103 S. Ct. at 2256. No more, however, than that of one of the circuit's own 
judges who wrote in dissent: "If there was ever a doubt prior to today, it is now clear 
that this court is committed to an assumed role as high public protector of all that is 
good from perceived evils of the nuclear age." Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
NRC, 685 F.2d at 517 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
68. 103 S. Ct. at 2255. 
69. Id. at 2256. 
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has considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection be-
tween the facts found and the choice made.70 
201 
In contrast, the Supreme Court agreed with the D.C. Circuit's finding of 
arbitrariness in the airbag case, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association. 
This case arose from the Reagan Administration's decision to reverse the long 
regulatory evolution towards mandatory passive restraint systems (automatic 
seat belts and airbags) in automobiles. After a period of comments and public 
hearings, the Secretary of Transportation, through the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), rescinded the passive restraint re-
quirement. The D.C. Circuit found that the decision to rescind was arbi-
trary,71 and the Supreme Court affirmed.72 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
took pains to point out that the Circuit's "path of analysis was misguided and 
the inferences it produced are questionable."73 
The Court disagreed with the Circuit's efforts to heighten the standard of 
review by reference to subsequent congressional action; failure of Congress to 
veto the prior rule did not in the Court's mind indicate that rescission of that 
rule must be tested under a higher standard. The Court did not find, as did the 
circuit court, that "the most troublesome question" in the case was the stan-
dard of review. Instead, it found that the "arbitrary or capricious" standard 
was clearly indicated by the fact that the agency action was informal 
rulemaking. 74 
The Court then determined how to apply the non-heightened arbitrariness 
standard. The Court found that the recision was arbitrary because the 
NHTSA failed to consider clearly viable alternatives. First, the Court could 
not accept the NHTSA's conclusion that airbags would not be valuable be-
cause the other type of passive restraints, automatic seatbelts, would be de-
tached by consumers. The Court found no justification for not requiring, in 
that case, airbags only. The full record of the rulemaking proceeding demon-
strated the value of airbags. The agency did not explain at the time why it did 
not adopt these rather obvious alternatives.75 
Furthermore, the Court could not find sufficient justification for the con-
clusion that automatic seatbelts must be made so they can be disconnected by 
consumers. It conceded that the need for detachable seatbelts and the 
probability that consumers would detach the belts were the type of matters 
which should be left to the expertise of the agency, but if found that the 
agency had not brought its expertise to bear on the question. "By failing to 
analyze the continuous seatbelts in its own right, the agency has failed to offer 
70. !d. at 2257. 
71. 680 F.2d 206, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2865 (1983). 
72. 103 S. Ct. at 2865. 
73. !d. at 2867. 
74. !d. at 2865. 
75. !d. at 2869. The Court refused to accept post hoc explanation by the appel-
late court. !d. at 2870 {"It is well-established that an agency's action must be upheld, 
if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself."). 
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the rational connection between facts and judgment required to pass muster 
under the arbitrary and capricious standard."76 
The airbag case is a perfect example of the arbitrariness standard in ac-
tion. The Court clearly recognized the demand for judicial restraint inherent 
in this test, but this restraint did not prevent the Court from smelling the bad 
air around this administrative decision. In contrast, the NRC in Baltimore 
Gas had done all that could be done in promulgating the fuel-cycle rule; it 
tried to make a very controlled and conservative decision. The Court upheld 
this decision even though the agency itself recognized some probability of er-
ror. The contrast between the cases is brought to light by the different treat-
ments of uncertainty. In the fuel cycle case, the Court almost applauded the 
agency's admission of uncertainty; it was clearly impressed by the agency's 
efforts to deal rationally with the unknowable. In the airbag case, on the other 
hand, the Court did not permit the uncertainty of the benefits of passive re-
straint to justify a refusal to regulate. The agency there had not done as much 
as it could have, and it had not made the best of the information that was 
available. An agency, the Court held, could revoke a regulation on the basis of 
serious uncertainty, but only "if supported by the record and reasonably ex-
plained."77 Neither element was present in the airbag case. In sum, even in an 
atmosphere of considerable restraint, a court can recognize when it must step 
in: when the agency has passed the boundary into arbitrariness. 
Because arbitrariness review necessarily focuses on adequate development 
of information, courts slide into a review focusing on the adequacy of the 
agency's information gathering procedure rather than on the substantive deci-
sion itself. This tendency is apparent in application of each review instruction, 
but it tends to dominate arbitrariness review both because the instruction is 
less understood and because the decisions are made on a greater variety of 
procedures. Here even more than the others, however, the court must focus on 
the difference between substantive and procedural review. 
As discussed in section III, a court's authority over procedure is superior 
to the agency's; it must do agreement review of procedural issues.78 By confus-
ing substantive review of a decision with the process for gaining support for 
that decision, courts, in an effort to follow the arbitrariness standard, often 
give the procedural question much less review than they should. Of the two, 
however, substantive review suffers most from this shift in emphasis. By shift-
ing emphasis, the court evades its responsibility to test the substantive deci-
sion. A court must meticulously separate its procedural review from its sub-
stantive review. A failure to do so may result in inadequate review of either or 
both the substantive and procedural elements of the decision. 
One effort to reconcile all the factors which contribute to arbitrariness 
76. Id. at 2873. 
77. Id. at 2871. 
78. See notes 268-80 and accompanying text infra. 
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review is Judge Leventhal's "hard look" doctrine.79 That doctrine focuses the 
inquiry on the agency. The reviewing court acts as a supervisor to assure that 
the agency has done its job. A court would overturn an agency decision only 
"if the court becomes aware, especially from a combination of danger signals, 
that the agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and 
has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decisionmaking."80 This was the review 
the Supreme Court conducted in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers.81 Certainly, 
in many cases, assurance that the agency acted with diligence, as in Baltimore 
Gas, will guard against arbitrariness. A court should start with this question. 
It should not, however, ignore other "danger signals" pointing to the kind of 
high risk of error associated with arbitrariness.82 
In undertaking arbitrariness review, it is also essential that a court distin-
guish arbitrariness review from review of discretion. Although the two are 
often combined, they are in fact quite different. Arbitrariness demands a weak 
review of judgments relating to questions that have right and wrong answers. 
Review of true discretion, on the other hand, involves an entirely different va-
riety of decision, a group of decisions which will be dealt with in the next 
section.83 Confusion enters the review system when Congress or the common 
law, in an attempt to prescribe weak review, uses phrases containing the word 
discretion, such as "abuse of discretion" or "in excess of discretion." Decisions 
covered by these instructions involve judgment, not true discretion, and such 
review might better be communicated by the arbitrariness standard.84 
Dworkin notes that we often refer to some forms of judgment as discre-
tion.85 For example, we might say that the rules of evidence give the judge 
discretion, but in fact they do not give true discretion because they require 
compliance with some standards (for Dworkin they confer a weak form of 
discretion).86 In this sense of discretion, we really mean unreviewable-the 
decisionmaker exercises the ultimate judgment. Unreviewable decisions, how-
ever, are not necessarily the exercise of true discretion. Understanding of true 
discretion requires the extensive analysis attempted in the next section. 
In recognizing the true nature of instructions using the term "discretion," 
79. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 ( 1971 ); see Leventhal, supra note 7, at 511. 
80. 444 F.2d at 851. 
81. See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra. 
82. Some courts have perverted this notion by reading it to mean that the court 
should take its own "hard look," and not just assure that the agency has. See National 
Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (describing the evolu-
tion of this misconception). This interpretation is either nonsense or it is wrong. 
83. See notes 111-55 and accompanying text infra. 
84. E.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-
54 (1982) ("Where Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his discretion, 
his judgments are subject to judicial review only to determine whether he has exceeded 
his statutory authority or acted arbitrarily."). 
85. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 {1977). 
86. Id. at 31-32. 
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a court might be guided by the recognition that weak review of some types of 
judgments is more likely to be conveyed through phrases using discretion. To 
recognize the proper instruction to follow, the court must look closely at the 
nature of the decisionmaking authority assigned to the agency. If the decision 
can be viewed as either right or wrong, usually according to some expressed or 
implied standards, then the review instruction means to convey a weak review 
of judgment and does not involve the complex question of review of true dis-
cretion discussed below. Once the court recognizes that it is not reviewing true 
discretion, its responsibilities are the same as with arbitrariness review because 
there is no functional difference between guarding against abuse of this sense 
of discretion and guarding against arbitrariness. 
Judge McGowen has stated that the tests for arbitrariness and abuse of 
discretion are far from discrete and should be viewed as cumulative.87 Discre-
tion used in this sense focuses on the same type of decision, and the review 
instruction conveys the same general meaning. The instruction tends to refer 
to "discretion," however, where the decision must involve nebulous or ambigu-
ous supporting conclusions. Where the decision is supported by a more evalua-
tive-type of conclusion, the review instruction is more likely to use terms refer-
ring to arbitrariness.88 No matter what phrasing is used, however, the intent is 
to instruct the court to tolerate a high risk of error in a decision which cannot 
or should not be tested more critically.89 
A predominant example of this sense of discretion is the power to stray 
beyond the general rule in order to do individual justice.90 Where Congress or 
the law has laid down rules for the general case, agencies often have implied 
87. Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1049 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979). 
88. E.g., Nicholson v. Brown, 599 F.2d 639, 646, 648 (5th Cir. 1979). For ex-
ample, courts tend to find that the failure to give reasons is an abuse of discretion-but 
not always. See City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 600 
F.2d 681, 689 (7th Cir. 1979). The choice of methodology is usually reviewed as an 
exercise of discretion. BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 655 (1st Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980). Some courts say that abuse of discretion 
may be found "only if there is no evidence to support the decision or if the decision is 
based on an improper understanding of the law." Song Jook Suh v. Rosenberg, 437 
F.2d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir .. 1971); see Jaimez-Revolla v. Bell, 598 F.2d 243, 246 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979). Courts tend to see the formulation of procedural rules as a question of 
agency discretion. E.g., FTC v. Anderson, 631 F.2d 741, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1979). It 
might be an abuse of discretion for an agency not to exercise its discretion. /d. at 750 
("A citizen may be entitled to a court ruling that an agency exercise its discretion even 
though the court cannot say which way the discretion is to be exercised."). 
89. "Abuse of discretion" has not been a particularly successful term in the law. 
Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 762 (1982). 
90. The Supreme Court has held that courts have similar types of discretion to 
make fine adjustments in the law. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 328-31 (1944). 
Although it would seem that courts do not have discretion to allow statutorily pro-
scribed conduct to continue, Platter, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 10 
CALIF. L. REV. 524, 532 (1982), they continually withhold for themselves that 
discretion. 
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or expressed authority to tailor these rules to fit a particular case.91 This 
residual power is called discretion, but it actually involves the exercise of judg-
ment. Without doubt, the freedom to make such judgments improves decision-
making and prevents considerable injustice; discretion in this sense is one of 
the major strengths of the administrative process. Nonetheless, such judg-
ments can and should be reviewed.92 A reviewing court can measure these 
decisions against the standards designed for the average case and against in-
tended deviations; it can apply the "real" standard to judge the probability 
that the agency reached a correct individual decision. In reviewing these judg-
ments, however, the reviewing court tampers with the very raison d'etre of 
agencies. Many agencies, indeed the entire administrative process, exist in or-
der to embody the expertise and experience needed to carry out individualized 
administrative justice and such judgments must remain the preserve of the 
entities designed to make them.93 For this reason, these individualizing judg-
ments are generally reviewed for "abuse" or "excess." These terms mean, in 
this context, that the individualizing decision should be overturned by a re-
viewing court only when it finds a very high risk of error. Hence, these judg-
ments must be reviewed under the same standard as that conveyed by the 
arbitrariness instruction.94 Whatever the phrasing, such standards tell the 
91. Sec K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JuSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 42-43 
{1969). 
92. Professor Davis probably refered to this sort of discretion in his inquiries on 
discretion when he talked about discretion as individualizing. Id. at 4-6. Administrative 
law usually is referring to such activity by the decisionmaker when it investigates 
discretion. 
One of the most important developments in the last few decades has been the 
recognition of the legitimacy of administrative discretion. Discretion is not, as some 
suggest, necessarily the result of unconstitutional or even poor legislation. J. FREED-
MAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN Gov-
ERNMENT 79-80, 93-94 (1978). It is the result of a conscious, and as Professor Davis 
demonstrates, potentially sound choice. K. DAVIS, supra note 91, at 42-43. Administra-
tive discretion is the backbone of the administrative process and the element from 
which the process derives much of its operational value. Without doubt, such freedom 
is often necessary and prevents considerable injustice. Administrative schemes which do 
not incorporate such flexibility are vastly inferior to those which do. One of the worst 
trends in modern administrative law is a retreat from this flexibility, and the injury to 
citizens from this trend is apparent everywhere. It robs the system of much of its value. 
Administrative decisions relying on this sense of discretion are extremely valuable to a 
government which is useful and fair to its citizens. A sound administrative agency 
should have expertise and experience with the fine tuning covered by a mandate involv-
ing this sense of discretion. Therefore, judges should not become too involved in such 
judgments, and hence they are usually admonished to stay out of this kind of decision-
making unless they find the risk of error very high. 
93. There is also a desire to protect scarce judicial resources, especially since 
there is some doubt as to whether the courts contribute much to this decisionmaking. 
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1295 (1975). 
94. Indeed, a court should be harsh with the agency only when it applies the 
rules more inflexibly than intended and fails to do individualized justice. 
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court to tolerate a relatively high risk of error.95 
D. Review Prohibited 
Some administrative programs completely withdraw certain decisions and 
issues from judicial oversight. The method by which this is done is described 
under the doctrine of unreviewability. Unreviewability performs the same mis-
sion as standards of review in that it also communicates the judiciary's func-
tion in a given administrative process. It differs in that it defines the extent to 
which a court is excluded altogether from a particular administrative 
process.96 
The review system has two forms of unreviewability: one precludes review 
of certain judgments, and the other precludes review of the exercise of true 
discretion.97 I argue in section II that true discretion is by nature unreview-
able. Hence, the second form of unreviewability is considered along with the 
whole problem of review of true discretion. Here, the discussion focuses on 
instances where judgments are not reviewable. This discussion of the last step 
on the review scale, no review, will complete the treatment of the review sys-
tem's decisions involving judgments. 
95. Although every reviewable administrative judgment should at least be re-
viewable for arbitrariness, courts sometimes limit themselves to a review which verges 
on acquiescence. Less frequently, courts will approve agency action after a cursory look 
at the expressed or even inferred basis for the action; they will consider only whether 
some justification can be found for the agency decision. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
DOE, 610 F.2d 796, 801 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 
(1980). 
This level of review equates to the rational basis in constitutional challenges, 
where no special reason for heightened scrutiny exists. See generally L. TRIBE, AlliER!· 
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 450-53 (1978). While administrative agencies implement 
legislation, such action never raises to the level of legislative action and carries none of 
the justification for such extreme judicial acquiescence. Even though agencies are often 
technically acting for the legislature, they are in fact an entirely different institution. 
Compare City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (rulemaking 
given less deference than legislation), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972) with Pacific 
State Box & Basket Co .• v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935) (equal deference 
given). Although democracy demands that the judiciary act very cautiously in evaluat-
ing legislative action, administrative acts are not the decisions of a representative body, 
and there is no theoretical reason for judicial acquiescence. The fact that the agency 
implements actions by the democratic branches, Congress and the presidency, helps 
justify the limited review discussed above, but it does not require using the same test as 
applied to the democratic institution. The judiciary should not interfere with decisions 
of those institutions for reasons which do not apply to agencies. 
96. A traditional distinction has grown between the area of review, reviewabil-
ity, and the degree standard of review. See S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 83 
(1941). Courts are prohibited from reaching beyond the area of review. Nevertheless, 
reviewability cannot be divorced from questions relating to standards of review. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
97. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982); see note 2 supra. 
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The modern review system does not favor unreviewability of judgments.98 
Sometimes an administrative program will perform better if some or all of the 
necessary judgments are left completely to the agency. The APA permits such 
instruction by authorizing unreviewability "to the extent that" a statute or 
other law removes a decision from the area of review.99 There are two implica-
tions of the APA provision. 
First, the phrase "to the extent that" limits the operation of an un-
reviewability instruction to whatever specific part of a decision the instruction 
refers. Where part of a decision is unreviewable, courts have nonetheless cor-
rected gross mistakes of law/00 procedural inadequacy/01 or the criteria under 
which an individual decision is made.102 Moreover, even where a question 
seems completely removed from judicial scrutiny, courts can review the consti-
tutionality of the underlying statute.103 
The second implication of the APA provision is that unreviewability of 
judgment can be found only where an affirmative determination has been 
made that the courts should remain outside the review system. Evidence of 
this determination must be found in a statute, but the extent to which the 
preclusion must be clear on the face of the statute is a matter of some contro-
versy. Some have argued that only express language can render an administra-
tive decision unreviewable; others have argued that the traditional tools of leg-
islative interpretation, such as legislative history and rules of statutory 
construction, should be used where the statute is unclear.104 The second ap-
proach has the advantage of consistency with the ordinary way of reading stat-
utes and the need to protect administrative programs from unintended judicial 
interferences. The first approach, however, expresses the modern aversion to 
98. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-48 (1967). 
99. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982). 
100. See L. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 359; Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: 
A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965, 990-91 n.145 (1969). But see 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 
l, § 28.16, at 80 (action committed by law to agency discretion is unreviewable). 
101. Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 443 (2d Cir. 1969) (imposed procedure 
which did not involve the court in wisdom of the unreviewable substantive decision of 
the Veteran Administration). Review may be limited to a designated group. Consumer 
Fed'n v. FTC, 515 F.2d 367, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
102. Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 
1974) (while parole decisions are unreviewable, criteria established by the board to 
make such decisions are not); Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland 590 F.2d 627, 631-32 (6th 
Cir. 1978) (unreviewability provision did not cover validity of Veterans Administration 
regulations). 
103. E.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 374-83 (1974). 
104. Compare K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 630-31 
(1976) (reviewability turns on judicial determinations rather than congressional intent) 
with Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (preclusion of review 
requires clear and convincing evidence of congressional intent) and Note, Statutory 
Preclusion of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 1976 DuKE L. 
J. 431, 449 (express statutory prohibition or other persuasive evidence of congressional 
intent can preclude review). 
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unreviewability. If the system is said to require express preclusion, then fewer 
decisions will be removed from judicial supervision. The first view also recog-
nizes that courts are perfectly capable of reviewing any decision involving 
judgment and that those decisions are usually unreviewable only because of 
factors such as judicial or administrative efficiency. Therefore, the system 
might well demand that preclusion of review of judgment should at least be 
clear if not necessarily explicit.105 
E. Coordinating the Instructions for Review of Administrative Judgment 
The distinctions among review authority have evolved because an effective 
judicial review system must provide a variety of judicial functions to meet the 
needs of particular administrative programs. The present system can tell the 
court to approach an administrative decision with one of four different atti-
tudes, or instructions, then work in concert to make a sound, workable review 
system.108 
The first instruction, agreement review, tells the court to determine 
whether it agrees with the agency's conclusion as to some or all of a decision. 
It tells the court to decide whether the weight of support is in favor of the 
agency. This instruction is the zenith of judicial authority, and any greater 
judicial involvement would require performance of administrative function in 
violation of the Constitution.107 The instruction, often termed de novo review, 
is usually given where agreement review is required of the whole decision, or 
the court may be said to have the power to substitute judgment. Whatever 
form, agreement review gives the courts a very active role in an administrative 
program. 
The second instruction tells the court to measure the agency's conclusion 
for reasonableness. It does not require the court to agree with the agency in 
order to uphold it, but only requires a determination that there is a relatively 
105. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 275 (1946). 
106. Although the word formulas used to convey these instructions sometimes 
add to the confusion, they contribute to a sound structure. Whether we accept charac-
terizations such as Judge McGowan's that are attitude designations, Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. SEC, 6.06 F.2d 1031, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1979), or see the word for-
mulas in more legalistic terms, they do express distinct relationships, which can be 
converted into meaningful guidance for a reviewing court. 
In form, section ... [702(2)] embodies a list of various adjectives or adjec-
tival phrases-any one of which, if found applicable, requires our disapproval 
of the administrative action in question. These formulations are far from be-
ing entirely discrete as a matter of the ordinary meaning of language, and, 
indeed are in some respects cumulative rather than differential in their 
applicability. 
Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
107. L. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 103-09. A general principle of constitutional law 
is that Congress cannot assign actual administrative functions to article III courts. See 
M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL 
POWER 13-14 (1980). 
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high probability that the agency is correct. Thus, a sharp break occurs be-
tween agreement review and reasonableness review; under the reasonableness 
standard the court is not an active participant in the decisionmaking process 
but is limited to supervision and monitoring. The reasonableness standard in-
struction is usually conveyed through the term "substantial evidence," but that 
term often leads to confusion when applied to nontrial-type procedure. This 
confusion is eliminated by recognizing that the instruction relates not to the 
kind of information but to the level of assurance it requires. It applies when-
ever a determination is made that a particular administrative program cannot 
tolerate a high risk of error. Such issues can be identified without regard for 
the structure of the decisionmaking process or the form of the record. 
The third instruction tells the court to guard against arbitrariness. This 
instruction is usually conveyed by terms such as "arbitrary or capricious" or 
"abuse of discretion." While it places the court in a monitoring role, the in-
struction involves decisions or issues where the particular administrative pro-
gram must or should tolerate a higher risk of error than that permitted under 
the reasonableness standard. Despite protest from some judges,108 the distinc-
tion between reasonableness and arbitrariness is crucial to the success of the 
review system because it allows the system to communicate two very different 
judicial roles. 
The key to this distinction is that the two instructions convey a search for 
two relatively different levels of confidence in the agency's decisionmaking. 
Reasonableness connotes the operation of a reasoning mind.109 Reasonableness 
review, as applied to an agency decision, requires a finding that the decision is 
consistent with what one would expect if a reasoning individual had made it. 
Under this instruction the court must reach the affirmative conclusion that the 
decision is within the realm of a correct decision, but the court need not ex-
plore any further to assure that it is the correct decision (defined as the deci-
sion the court would have reached). Arbitrariness, on the other hand, requires 
a negative conclusion; the court must decide that the agency decision cannot 
be right. If it finds that the conclusion cannot be right, then it stops and 
reverses. If it finds that the conclusion might be right, the court stops and 
makes no further inquiry into how likely it is that the decision is right.110 
Thus, while the semantic difference does not seem startling, there is a vast 
gap between the two perspectives. To find something arbitrary, the court must 
108. Judge Leventhal was among those who asserted that the arbitrary or capri-
cious test and the substantial evidence test express converging or nearly identical de-
grees of judicial scrutiny. Leventhal, supra note 7, at 540. Judge Leventhal also has 
observed that in his long tenure on the appellate bench he had not found a case which 
was upheld under the substantial evidence test that would have failed under the clearly 
erroneous test. Discussion, supra note 7, (Hon. H. Leventhal), reprinted in 32 An. L. 
REV. at 290. 
109. L. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 596. 
110. A pundit may contend that this accurately describes bureaucrats, and if this 
is the case, then everything the government does is arbitrary. I disagree. 
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reach a conclusion such as: "This is what I would expect of Attilla the Hun." 
Reasonableness, on the other hand, requires a positive attitude towards the 
decision, such as: "This is the kind of position one would expect of Marcus 
Aurelius with whom I always violently disagree." There is a tremendous gap 
between the two mental processes, and this gap expresses the distinction be-
tween reasonableness review and arbitrariness review. 
The fourth instruction, unreviewability, tells the court that it has no role 
with respect to a decision. Sometimes a decision is made that a program would 
be better served if the agency acts as the final decisionmaker on some issues in 
a decision. The difficulty here is determining whether that decision to preclude 
judicial review has in fact been made. Even where the instruction is found, the 
courts may have some functions, such as interpretation of law or 
constitutionality. 
This variety in review of decisions involving judgment is essential to a 
successful system of review, and judges must make the effort to determine 
what instruction applies to the decision before them. Section III will discuss 
how a judge is to make this determination. Before that, however, the unique 
problem of review of true discretion must be analyzed because it differs funda-
mentally from review of judgment. 
II. REVIEW OF DISCRETION 
Review of true discretion presents some very difficult conceptual 
problems. The concept of discretion itself is one of the most mysterious in the 
law.m The exercise of true discretion is often confused with other types of 
decisions, making the review instructions as to true discretion inadequately 
developed and difficult to communicate. Discretionary decisionmaking is one 
of the least understood legal concepts. Attempts at defining discretion have not 
been very helpful as guidelines to a reviewing court.112 As a result, contempo-
rary writing on the subject has been random and ambiguous.113 Failure to 
isolate decisions that are the result of discretion from other types of decisions 
adds to confusion. The exercise of discretion is a very special type of adminis-
trative decision and must be reviewed consistently with this special nature. 
Only by isolating the qqestion of review of discretion from other forms of re-
view can the law develop the necessary concepts. 
Ill. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 555-56; Platter, Statutory Violations 
and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 524 (1982}. 
112. Friendly, supra note 89, at 754; Gifford, Discretionary Decisionmaking in 
Regulatory Agencies: A Conceptual Framework, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 102-03 
(1984). See generally H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1962). 
113. E.g., Friendly, supra note 89, at 754 ("[In] discussing the allocation of 
power between trial and appellate courts, I find it more useful to say that the trial 
judge has discretion in those cases where his ruling will not be reversed simply because 
an appellate court disagrees. If this be circular, make the most of it!"); see also Gif-
ford, supra note 112, at 101-35. 
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The mystery surrounding the concept of discretion and the tendency to 
confuse it with other types of decisionmaking lead to very unsatisfactory in-
structions about the assigned judicial role in reviewing discretion. The term 
"discretion" is used very imprecisely in review instructions. For example, in-
structions relating to "abuse" or "excess" of discretion often refer to weak 
review of decisions which involve judgment, not true discretion.U4 Moreover, 
instructions as to review of true discretion are rarely explicit, and the nature of 
the court's role with respect to such decisions must be gleaned from more gen-
eral review instructions or from the nature of the administrative decision. Con-
sequently, this section offers guidance on identifying and understanding the 
exercise of discretion. It then looks at how courts should review discretion, 
including the question of whether they should review it at all. 
A. The Nature of Discretionary Decisionmaking 
The first step in understanding discretion is to separate it from decisions 
involving judgment, decisions that can be evaluated as right or wrong. The 
jurisprudential literature helps develop this distinction. For example, Professor 
Dworkin has explained: 
Sometimes we use "discretion" in a weak sense, simply to say that for some 
reason the standards an official must apply cannot be applied mechanically 
but demand the use of judgment. . . . 
... We use "discretion" sometimes not merely to say that an official 
must use judgment in applying the standards set for him by authority, or that 
no one will review that exercise of judgment, but to say that on some issue he 
is simply not bound by standards set by the authority in question. • . . 
. . . An official's discretion means not that he is free to decide without 
recourse to standards of sense and fairness, but only that his decision is not 
controlled by a standard furnished by the particular authority we have in 
mind when we raise the question of discretion. Of course this latter sort of 
freedom is important; that is why we have the strong sense of discretion. 
Someone who has discretion in this [strong] sense can be criticized, but not 
for being disobedient .... m 
Thus, one can demand that a decision involving judgment be correct-that it 
conform to some expressed, implied, or derived standard. A reviewing court 
can evaluate the exercise of judgment according to the decision's probable cor-
rectness and can control for a certain risk of error. A court cannot demand, 
however, that the exercise of true discretion be right. A reviewing court can 
refer to some form of standard, but it cannot evaluate the discretionary deci-
sion according to such standards and it cannot focus its review on correcting 
114. See text accompanying note 83-86 supra. 
115. R. DwoRKIN, supra note 85, at 31-33. Compare Gifford, Decisions, Deci-
sional Referents and Administrative Justice, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1972) 
(internal, self-imposed constraints limit the exercise of discretion). 
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potential error.116 
Professor Jaffe has offered extraordinary insight into the nature of the 
discretionary decisions. He recognized that review of discretion found its base 
in the fundamental existence of "a purported application of the statutory grant 
of power to the facts as found."117 He separated these grants according to 
three types of rules they might create.118 Of these three types of rules, two left 
no room for the exercise of discretion because the application of facts were 
conclusive. In contrast, the third type of rule merely suggested what type of 
facts are relevant but did not make them conclusive. Where the grant is of this 
nature, the agency must exercise true discretion because any standard which 
might be found or derived from the grant only guides the decision. In applying 
this vision of discretion, one that is consistent with Dworkin's insights, Profes-
sor Jaffe explained that discretion compelled 
... the administrator to resort to a whole complex of additional concepts and 
attitudes, official and personal, some of which he may not express, some of 
which he may be unaware of .... The mind focuses attention for a period of 
time on a group of authoritative decisional factors. But ultimately it reaches 
decision by an intuitive leap.119 
The essence of discretionary decisionmaking is that knowable factors pass 
through an unknowable process to a decision. This, as Professor Jaffe suggests, 
can be analogized to an intuitive mental process. Intuition is the process of 
knowing, but without conscious reasoning. It is the ability of the subconscious 
mind to synthesize variables in a more complex way than can the conscious 
mind. For instance, one can recognize the color blue but would be hard 
pressed to define the color in words.120 The equivalent of intuitive thinking in 
116. The nature of my inquiry here is to try to help judges understand their role 
in reviewing administrative action. The concept of discretion has plagued legal theorists 
for generations. 
117. L. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 555-56. 
118. 
For our present purpose of understanding the way in which rules function in a 
decision, we may note three types of rules. First, a rule may isolate a fact as 
determinative, as where, for example, an employee is barred from receiving 
compensation if his injury is attributable to his deliberate violation of a shop 
regulation. Second, a rule may provide that a fact is relevant but not conclu-
sive. . . . There may be said to be a third category of rule. . . . It singles out 
a consideration as relevant, but provides no further rule for the application of 
the consideration. 
Id. at 555. 
119. L. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 555-56. 
120. I can find no other way to convey a sense of the potential advantage of this 
sort of mental process than the following oriental fable: 
The centipede was happy, quite, 
until a toad in fun 
Said, 'Pray, which leg goes after which?' 
This worked his mind to such a pitch, 
He lay distracted in a ditch, 
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the administrative process is a blend of various decisionmakers with their spe-
cial talents and instincts. The blending of decisionmaking elements creates a 
kind of decisional synergism, whereby the whole decisional process is greater 
than the sum of its parts. 
Discretionary decisionmaking by an agency, therefore, takes special ad-
vantage of a wide variety of experience and expertise. Just as an individual 
thinking intuitively synthesizes an immeasurable array of data in his subcon-
scious, an administrative institution exercising true discretion brings to bear on 
any problem a meshing of personnel with a variety of instincts, values, sensi-
tivities, experience, and knowledge. This is one of the reasons Congress, or the 
common law, confers discretion on an agency rather than the more monolithic 
judiciary. The advantage of the agency is not just the special processes 
designed for specific decisions but also the bringing together of a special blend 
of contributors to the decisionmaking process. This second advantage finds its 
expression in the power to exercise true discretion. 
Thus, the essence of review of discretion cannot be understood without 
recognizing that the advantage of discretionary decisionmaking lies in the 
freestyle interaction of these decisionmaking elements, not in the rationality of 
the decision itself. Discretionary decisionmaking cannot, by its nature, be as 
rational as decisions based on judgment. A court which fails to distinguish 
discretionary from judgment review robs the discretionary function of its rich-
ness and eliminates a major advantage of the administrative process. 
Efforts to rationalize discretionary decisionmaking unsuccessfully attempt 
to add certainty where there can be no real certainty. Indeed, the temptation 
to simplify merely makes judicial decisions seem more satisfying, much the 
same way that any simplistic answer to a complicated and unanswerable ques-
tion makes it more acceptable to unsophisticated observers. 
The absence of any sense Qf correctness in discretionary decisionmaking 
justifies relying upon the interaction of an agency's decisionmaking elements, 
rather than the evaluative posture of the courts, to reach the best feasible 
result. For this reason, discretionary decisionmaking cannot be shared with or 
Considering how to run. 
Intuitive thinking is a very slippery concept, especially for the Western mind. Oriental 
philosophies more readily see the value of mental processes based on intuition and they 
have explored it in considerable depth. The Western mind is more "scientific" and has 
been conditioned to reject the intuitive. In writing about this fundamental difference, 
Professor Northrop described it as the difference between a concept achieved by intui-
tion and that by postulation: 
A concept by intuition is one which denotes, and the complete meaning of 
which is given by, something which is immediately appended. "Blue" in the 
sense of the sensed color is a concept by intuition. . . . A concept by postula-
tion is one the complete meaning of which is designated by the postulates of 
the deductive theory in which it occurs. . . . "Blue" in the sense of the num-
ber of a wave-length in electro-magnetic theory is a concept by postulation." 
F. Northrop, The Complementary Emphasis of Eastern Intuitive and Western Scien-
tific Philosophy, in C. MOORE, PHILOSOPHY, EAST AND WEST 173 {1944). 
214 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
evaluated by the courts.121 A discretionary process can be analogized to the 
results of a lottery. Assume that Congress intended randomness to decide ad-
ministrative issues through a lottery system. A reviewing court would then 
have the choice of letting the results stand or substituting its own non-random 
judgment. Similarly, the court cannot evaluate the actual result of the exercise 
of discretion, but must either accept the result or substitute its own decision.122 
Therefore, courts must show special restraint in approaching discretionary 
decisions,123 but discretionary decisionmaking is not beyond all review. Courts 
do have a monitoring function where an administrative program requires dis-
cretionary administrative decision. But this monitoring function differs funda-
mentally from the monitoring function in review of judgment. 
B. The Nature of Review of Discretion 
Once a court has identified a decision as one to be left to the true discre-
tion of the agency, it is faced with the question of how to review that decision. 
The court knows it is not authorized to substitute its discretion for that of the 
agency, but it must realize that it still has some function. What this function 
should be, however, is much more difficult to derive and describe than its func-
tion with respect to review of judgments. The various types of review of judg-
ment can be distinguished according to a sliding scale of potential correctness, 
but decisions based on true discretion cannot be evaluated in this way. How, 
then, is a court to approach administrative discretionary decisions? 
The judicial function is better understood if the discretionary decision-
making process is analogized to a black box. The part of the decision which 
results from true discretion comes from the black box, and there is no way to 
evaluate what went on to see how that result was- reached.124 The court can, 
however, take notice of the environment surrounding the black box and the 
121. See Schauer, Can Rights Be Abused?, 31 PHIL. Q. 225, 226-27 (1981). 
122. Care must be taken not to confuse review of the exercise of discretion with 
review of the exercise of randomness. The two are unreviewable for the same reason, 
but they are quite different in implementation. Choices made by randomness cannot be 
reviewed; either one set of chance or another makes the choice. For example, if housing 
is to be allocated among equally eligible people by lottery, then the result of a properly 
run lottery cannot be reviewed. In this sense the two are alike, but the process of using 
chance and process of relying on complex intuitive-like conclusions are very different. 
The former is unreviewable because it is totally insensitive, whereas the latter is unre-
viewable because it incorporates sensitivity to an incalcuable array of ingredients. It is 
for this reason that some type of judicial involvement is appropriate for discretion. 
123. E.g., BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Castle, 598 F.2d 637, 655 (Ist Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980); Jaimez-Revolla v. Bell, 598 F.2d 243, 246 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979); Smith v. Saxbe, 562 F.2d 729, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
124. A court's function is limited to assuring that the discretion is confined and 
controlled. Discretion can be controlled through innovations such as requiring agencies 
to formulate and disclose policy through rulemaking. But cf. Sofaer, Judicial Control 
of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 CoLUM. L. REV. 1293, 
1325-30 {1972) (rigid rules hamper agency flexibility). 
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external elements which bear on its operation. These external elements are 
visible even though the actual internal operation of the box is not. 
One crucial external element is what actually enters the black box. As 
Professor Dworkin says, "An official's discretion means not that he is free to 
decide without recourse to standards of sense and fairness, but only that his 
discretion is not controlled by a standard furnished by a particular author-
ity .... "12G Thus, while the actual exercise of discretion is an unknowable 
melding of factors, the court can assure that all relevant factors are part of the 
brew.126 The reviewing court's first job is to identify these factors-which it-
self is difficult-and then ensure that they are not ignored by the administra-
tive decisionmaker. Having gained this assurance, the court then must ensure 
that the administrative decision reflects the appropriate use of these elements, 
bearing in mind that the administrative decisionmaker "may freely use all per-
missible elements, though an excessive emphasis on one to the exclusion of 
other elements may be an abuse of discretion."127 
Because the only real substantive review of true discretion must focus on 
determining that all relevant factors were considered, review tends to focus on 
the agency's explanation for its discretionary choice. A discretionary decision 
cannot be supported in the same way a judgment can, but it can be justified, 
giving consideration to relevant factors as well as explaining the use of experi-
ence and expertise. Requiring reasoned decisionmaking does not inject the 
court into the exercise of discretion so long as the court looks only for the 
existence of a sound basis upon which the discretionary decisionmaking pro-
cess could have operated.128 
In addition to assuring that all relevant factors entered the discretionary 
decisionmaking process, the court conducting abuse of discretion review must 
examine those elements which influenced the discretionary decisionmaking, 
those general pressures which push on the black box process. Discretionary 
125. R. DwoRKIN, supra note 85, at 33. 
126. Where the agency traditionally has broad discretion, it may be appropriate 
for the reviewing court to limit its examination for arbitrariness to the agency's expla-
nation. See FCC v. WNCN Listener's Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 597-600 (1981) (broad 
discretion over policy questions); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 572-73 (1975) 
(prosecutorial-type discretion). 
127. L. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 556. The judiciary in France and most western 
European countries will involve themselves in decisions based on absolute discretion. L. 
BROWN & J. GARNER, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 136-37 (2d. ed. 1973). Where 
the court exercises this discretion, it is the court, not the administrative official, which 
possesses the strong discretion. On the other hand, the French model confines jurisdic-
tion over administrative action to a separate judicial apparatus, the Conseil d'etat. In-
volvement in the discretionary decisions themselves by a special administrative court 
system does not seem as inappropriate as it would under our system, where the civil 
courts review administrative action. 
128. Courts have been on notice since the Supreme Court's decision in Morgan 
v. United States, 304 U.S. I (1938) that "it is not the function of the court to probe 
the mental process" of the decisionmaker. Id. at 18; see Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
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decisions which incorporate specific factors relevant to a particular decision 
are not made in a vacuum. They are subject to a variety of pressures which 
are internalized by the discretionary decision. Administrative justice can toler-
ate some of these pressures but not all of them, and the court must ferret out 
those influences which have exerted unacceptable pressure and which might 
have affected the operation of the discretionary decisionmaking process. The 
difficulty comes in distinguishing unacceptable pressures from those pressures 
which led to the vesting of discretion in the agency in the first place. It is 
difficult, for example, to distinguish unacceptable prejudgment from experi-
ence and expertise.129 In reviewing true discretion, the courts must take care to 
sort out those pressures which properly channel the discretion from those 
which improperly skew the discretionary decision. 
A reviewing court might, for example, overturn discretionary action be-
cause the discretionary decision is the result of bias or influence.130 While the 
mere existence of such elements is not enough to conclude that the exercise of 
discretion is necessarily tainted, it might justify a finding of abuse when there 
is a substantial potential that these elements disrupted the proper functioning 
of the discretionary process. The subtlety necessary for this analysis is shown 
by the fact that only a very limited variety of bias has been found inappropri-
ate for administrative decisionmaking.131 Improper influence by political ele-
ments of government on the machinery of discretion may also give cause to 
find abuse,132 but influence does not necessarily compel such a finding. Often 
influence is merely the valid incorporation of democratic consideration and 
hence is beyond the scope of judicial inquiry. On the other hand, the likelihood 
that some prohibited forms of bias or influence have distorted the discretionary 
decision would justify a finding of abuse of discretion.133 
A court might also examine the discretionary machinery to ensure that 
the results were a true function of the black box.134 Thus, abuse of discretion 
129. The notion of expertise suggests an understanding of facts gained from ex-
perience combined with informed predisposition. Reich, The Law of the Planned Soci-
ety, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1242 (1966). 
130. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 596 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1979), aj]'d, 449 U.S. 
232 (1980), is an example of this type of analysis. The court properly found that the 
FTC's determination that there existed "reason to believe" that the law had been vio-
lated so as to support the issuance of an administrative complaint was within the FTC's 
absolute discretion. The only question it entertained was whether the exercise of this 
absolute discretion was tainted by congressional pressure. The Supreme Court found 
that the "reason to believe" determination was not reviewable until the administrative 
process was complete. 449 U.S. at 236. 
131. Koch, Prejudgment: An Unavailable Challenge to Official Administrative 
Action, 33 FED. B. Ass'N J. 218 (1974). 
132. E.g., District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 
1245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Texas Medical Ass'n v. Matthews, 408 F. Supp. 303, 306-
07 (W.D. Tex. 1976). 
133. E.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Pillsbury 
Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966). 
134. Professor Schwartz formulated several categories of abuse. B. ScHWARTZ, 
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review might also evaluate the procedures used, in much the same way a court 
might examine a lottery machine to ensure that its results were truly random. 
Courts have a broad and inherent power to review administrative proce-
dures, 135 but they cannot use procedural review to substitute their own discre-
tion for the discretion assigned to the agency. 
Consequently, although actual operation of the discretionary decision-
making process cannot be evaluated, the external elements which operate on 
the process can be identified and examined to assure that they do not improp-
erly skew the process. This is not flimsy review, but review of a kind different 
from the evaluative review applied to judgments. 
C. Review of Discretion and the Doctrine of Unreviewability 
The nature of review of true discretion leads directly to the concept of 
unreviewability within the context of true discretion. While a court can assure 
that relevant factors are considered and that the discretion is not skewed by 
improper pressures or procedures, it cannot stray into the actual discretionary 
decision. Consequently, when the decision involves true discretion, the doc-
trines of unreviewability and standard of review merge. 
The distinction between judgment and discretion helps understand the re-
lationship between the two. In the system for review of judgment discussed 
above/36 the scale of possible review instructions ended with judgments which 
Congress withdraws altogether from judicial scrutiny. This unreviewability of 
judgment is codified in the APA by the statutory preclusion provision.137 Be-
cause there is nothing in the nature of these judgments which precludes re-
view, the preclusion must be directed by express language or, at the least, 
clear intent.138 Preclusion of review of discretion is quite different and this 
difference is also codified in the APA; with respect to true discretion, the APA 
precludes review "to the extent that" the agency decision is "committed to 
agency discretion by law."139 The combination of these two phrases has long 
been interpreted as precluding review only where the assignment of discretion 
is so complete that judicial scrutiny would be improper140 and the decision so 
committed to agency discretion as to foreclose the possibility of a role for the 
court.141 In short, the APA preclusion provision codifies the inherent un-
reviewability of the discretion. 
supra note 35, at 611. 
135. See notes 268-80 and accompanying text infra. 
136. See notes 96-105 and accompanying text supra. 
137. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a)(1) (1982). 
138. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 140-41. 
139. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982). 
140. MANUAL, supra note 3, at 95. 
141. 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 80. The language of the original 
APA-"except so far as"--expressed this intention somewhat more clearly. Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 10, 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946). 
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The Supreme Court in Overton Park provided a standard for determining 
whether a decision is so committed to agency discretion as to make it by its 
nature beyond judicial scrutiny.142 In arguing against judicial authority over 
the Secretary's decision to approve a highway through a public park, the gov-
ernment in Overton Park argued that such decisions were so committed to the 
Secretary's discretion as to preclude review. The Court found that a decision 
could be committed to agency discretion to such an extent as to preclude re-
view only when there was "no law to apply."143 The Supreme Court means by 
"no law to apply" that there are no standards by which to evaluate the deci-
sion.144 If there are no standards to apply, then there is no way a court can 
review it without usurping the discretionary function assigned to the agency.1411 
If the court finds that the agency decision is the result of such authority, then 
it cannot evaluate the decision without usurping that authority, because there 
are no standards by which to evaluate it.146 The decision is to be the result of 
the intuitive or discretionary process discussed above.147 
Therefore, the scope of unreviewability of discretionary decisionmaking, 
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Overton Park, fits the conclusion al-
ready reached with respect to the nature of review of the exercise of discretion. 
Where there are standards by which the decision can be evaluated, whether 
expressed by or derived from the law, then the court can exercise proper re-
view by using these standards. If no standards exist, or the standards are in-
tended only to guide the agency decision, then the decision involves true dis-
cretion. As the Supreme Court put it, there is "no law to apply" where no 
142. 401 U.S. at 415-17. 
143. !d. at 413; seeS. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 212 (1946) ("If, for 
example, statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to 
apply, courts of course have no statutory question to review."). As suggested by the 
drafters of the APA, "law to apply" might not be the only factor although Overton 
Park has raised it to a special place. Other factors were formulated in Saperstein, 
Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 
HARV. L. REv. 366 (1968). The Third Circuit has suggested criteria which include: (I) 
the broad discretion given an agency in a particular area; (2) the extent to which the 
action is a product of political, economic or managerial choices that are inherently not 
subject to judicial review; and (3) the extent that the challenged action is based on 
some knowledge or expertise. Local 2855, AFGE v. United States, 602 F.2d 575, 578-
80 (3d Cir. 1979); see Bullard v. Webster, 623 F.2d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir. 1980). 
144. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413. 
145. See the examples given in MANUAL, supra note 3, at 94-95. A similar result 
controls judicial review of trustee's decisions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 
§ 187 comment g, i (1959); 4 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 334.1 (1967) ("If 
there is a standard by which the reasonableness of the exercise of the trustee's discre-
tion can be tested, the court will control the exercise of his discretion if, but only if, he 
acts beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment."). 
146. The phrase in section 701(a)(2) "by law" includes common law, custom, 
and tradition. The phrase broadens the search for the discretionary nature of decision-
making. See Kliendienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972); United States ex rei. 
Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371, 374-75 (2d Cir. 1968). 
147. See text accompanying notes 119-23 supra. 
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standards exist or where they are not mandatory.148 Again, these decisions can 
be monitored by courts searching for the defects discussed above, but they 
cannot be judged for potential correctness.149 
A titanic controversy, however, rages over the message of the discretion-
ary unreviewability provision of the APA. Professor Davis has argued that 
when a decision is "committed to agency discretion by law," a reviewing court 
can do no review whatever, not even for abuse of discretion.m Judge Friendly 
created a line of authority through his opinion in Wong Wing Hang v. JNS151 
whereby the courts still retain some review authority even where the action is 
committed to agency discretion. His view was that a reviewing court is still 
authorized to question whether the agency exercised its discretion properly. 
Several commentators support the notion that a reviewing court can at least 
guard against the exercise of discretion which is outside permissible bounds.152 
Under Judge Friendly's approach, statutorily commanded unreviewability may 
stand alone at the point where judicial review is completely precluded, and 
unreviewability of discretion may fall somewhat short of this absolute 
preclusion. 
The controversy which rages between Davis on one side and Friendly, 
Jaffe, and company on the other over whether review of discretion can ever be 
totally precluded, is a rather empty dispute. Both sides would review factors 
which have an impact on the exercise of discretion to ensure against abuse, 
and indeed such review seems commanded by the "to the extent that" lan-
guage in section 701. It is easy to agree with Friendly's view that discretion is 
always reviewable for those factors he identified/53 and at the same time to 
148. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413. Nevertheless, this concept seems inconsis-
tent with the nonde1egation doctrine, which finds unconstitutional any standardless del-
egation of legislative power. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 292 {1936); 
Butterfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 
{1892). If so, then a statute such as that given as an example in the MANUAL, supra 
note 3, at 94, which authorized the President to act "if in his judgment" the action was 
necessary may have conferred unreviewable discretion, but it may also be an improper 
delegation. Indeed, the APA legislative history hints that the exercise of so broad a 
delegation would not be reviewable, but the underlying statute would be subject to 
attack: "Where laws are so broadly drawn that agencies have large discretion, the situ-
ation cannot be remedied by an administrative procedure act but must be treated by 
the revision of statutes conferring administrative power." S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 
2d Sess. 275 (1946). Of course, undelegated discretion could be unreviewable "by 
law," e.g., a military decision, without running afoul of the nondelegation doctrine. See 
1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 177 (2d ed. 1978). 
149. SeeS. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 275 (1946) ("Matters of discre-
tion are necessarily exempted from the [judicial review] section since otherwise courts 
would in effect supersede agency functioning."). 
150. 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 28.16, at 80. 
151. 360 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1966). 
152. L. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 359; Berger, supra note 100, at 969. 
153. Even when an administrative decision is so committed to agency discretion 
as to preclude review, a court could still find abuse of discretion if the agency action 
"were made without rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established poli-
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agree with Professor Davis that the discretion itself is beyond a reviewing 
court's reach. Davis's general discussion of review agrees with the Friendly 
position that a reviewing court can question those things which might have an 
impact on the exercise of discretion or guarantee that the agency performed its 
discretionary duty as assigned.1114 To be consistent, Professor Jaffe, who shares 
Judge Friendly's view, must be read to agree that, while those things which 
motivate the "intuitive leap" are reviewable, the actual leap itself, or discre-
tionary decision, is not. 
The two views are reconciled by seeing that each administrative decision 
involves the resolution of a myriad of different issues. Some of those issues 
may involve discretionary decisionmaking. If so, they are unreviewable. Other 
issues, those which do not involve the exercise of discretion, may be review-
able. The court still may have a duty to evaluate the decision itself on review-
able issues. Even where the whole decision is discretionary, certain issues arise 
which invite the judgment of the courts. For example, the courts may review 
procedures, and the criteria by which the discretionary decision is made,m 
even when the underlying substantive decision is discretionary. Both views of 
the preclusion section understand this limit on review and hence the struggle 
between the two views seems unnecessary. 
Ill. DISCERNING THE RIGHT MESSAGE 
The foundation of a strong judicial review component in the administra-
tive process is the existence of a sufficient variety of instructions which com-
municates the optimum judicial role to a court. A system of instructions per-
mits Congress to investigate and then communicate how the judiciary can best 
serve the particular administrative scheme.1G6 The major premise of this Arti-
cies or rested . . . on other 'considerations that Congress could not have intended to 
make relevant.'" Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir. 1966) 
(Friendly, J.) (quoting United States ex rei. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489, 
491 (2d Cir. 1950)). 
154. In discussing § 701(a)(2), Professor Davis has observed: "So far as the ac-
tion is by law 'committed' to agency discretion, it is not reviewable ... ; it is not 'com-
mitted' to agency discretion to the extent that it is reviewable. 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 
1, at 80. "Extremely important is ... that agency action may be partly committed to 
agency discretion, even though it is in some aspects reviewable." Id. at 84. 
155. See notes 101-02 supra. 
156. The limitations of language impede a clear explanation of the instructions 
for review. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 3, at 820 ("One emerges from this trail 
through a thicket of numbers [from the empirical survey] without having discovered 
any clear and consistent pattern, whether of close judicial supervision or of deference to 
the agency's responsibilities.''); Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative 
Law, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 771, 780 (1975) ("At best, concepts such as 'substantial 
evidence' tend to be little more than convenient labels attached to results reached with-
out their aid.''). 
Since the precise way in which courts interfere with agency findings cannot be 
imprisoned within any form of words, new formulas attempting to rephrase 
the old are not likely to be more helpful. . . . There are no talismanic words 
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cle is that such a system is in place and is fundamentally sound. It has just 
enough variety of instructions to communicate the several judicial roles for 
administrative decisionmaking relying on judgment, and it perceives the way 
the courts must approach the discretion. Now we need only to explore how this 
system communicates those instructions. Congress unfortunately does not 
often express its intent with clarity and precision. Thus, we must look for 
meaningful devices for discerning congressional intent; These devices also 
serve to guide the judiciary in finding the optimum role in a given scheme 
where there is no discernible message from Congress. This develops the best 
allocation of agency and judicial decisionmaking responsibility. 
Two methods currently exist for determining the will of Congress with 
respect to judicial review: the process-oriented approach, and the issue-ori-
ented approach. These methods add precision to the crude hints Congress usu-
ally leaves as to its intent, and they aid in the development of the common law 
where Congress has left a gap.157 Both are used by courts in seeking congres-
that can avoid the process of judgment. The difficulty is that we cannot es-
cape, in relation to this problem, the use of undefined defining terms. 
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.). 
157. Final orders are now reviewed almost exclusively under petitions for statu-
tory review, with the standard usually set by Congress. Statutes requiring formal adju-
dication invariably prescribe substantial evidence review. Direct review of rules 
presents a tougher question. It is well established that direct review provisions cover 
pre-enforcement review of final rules from formal and informal procedures. It does not 
appear, however, that this affects the scope of review. Review of rules under direct 
review is substantial evidence only if the statute so provides or if the rule is made on a 
formal record. Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: 
Quest for the Optimum Forum, 15 CoLUM. L. REv. I (1975). 
If no statute provides for access to the courts, a challenge must proceed through a 
non-statutory vehicle. The choice of means affects the standard of review. The best 
choice is the general utility remedy: injunction or declaratory judgment. This remedy is 
even more attractive now that federal question jurisdiction requires no amount in con-
troversy, 28 U.S.C. § 133I (Supp. IV I980), and recent amendments to the APA have 
made it easier to sue the government where no money is sought. See H.R. REP. No. 
1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1976), reprinted in I976 U.S. ConE CoNG. & AD. 
NEWS 612I, 6I21. The only limits on this form are general theories on the standard of 
review and the equitable nature of the remedy. Courts often demand that irreparable 
harm and the absence of an adequate remedy at law be shown. These prerequisites are 
largely a pleading problem, for most courts tend to be lenient in examining them. 
The role of the common law writs continues to decline. Mandamus is most com-
monly used, although nothing can be done through mandamus that cannot be accom-
plished through a mandatory injunction. Technically, however, mandamus can be used 
only to compel ministerial acts and not discretionary functions. Although the courts 
have stretched this form as far as possible, its limits on the standard of review make 
mandamus extremely unattractive. Its prior advantage, the opportunity to circumvent 
amount in controversy requirements, has been nullified by changes to § 1331. 
Although ostensibly a means to test only the legality of confinement, habeas 
corpus has been used to gain review of the conditions of confinement. Like mandamus, 
the habeas writ may have once been useful for evading amount in controversy and 
exhaustion requirements. Given recent changes, there is no reason why an injunction or 
declaratory judgment action cannot substitute for the writ when administrative action 
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sional will or in fashioning optimum rules for themselves. The process-oriented 
approach keys the type of review to the process whereby the agency is to make 
the decision. This process analysis furthers the inquiry because the procedures 
used affect the agency record that reaches the court, which in turn affects the 
depth and nature of the review. 
The process, and the record it produces, are not the only factors which 
describe the nature and depth of review. The type of issue under review is 
more important. In any given process, the function of the reviewing court var-
ies according to the several decisions which lead to the final decision. Indeed, 
greater emphasis on defining the judicial role according to component issues in 
a decision will add considerable precision to describing the review function. 
This issue-oriented approach is already used and finds support in many sound 
opinions.158 
Although the process analysis receives more frequent use, its limitations 
suggest the need for a shift to greater use of issue-oriented instructions and 
analysis. The two approaches work well together. The process-oriented ap-
proach gives a crude approximation of the general level of review required, 
while the issue-oriented approach adds precision. The two approaches are, 
therefore, analyzed below. 
A. The Judicial Role According to the Administrative Process 
The reviewing court must first ask, of course, what type of review Con-
gress intended when it established the particular administrative process. The 
statute may either give instructions through one of the word formulas or 
through the type of procedure the agency must follow to make the decision. In 
recognition of the latter possibility, the APA attempts to fill any legislative 
gap by prescribing review authority according to the type of procedure used.159 
Even when one of the word formulas is used, that formula is usually consistent 
with the review appropriate for certain procedures. Thus one way to determine 
the type of review prescribed is to look at the type of procedure and the type 
of record it produces. 
1. Using the Administrative Process to Discern the Type of Review 
The role of the courts is affected by the type of procedure used to reach 
the administrative decision. This leads to some confusion, because the adminis-
is involved. 
Prohibition and certiorari are suitable only for reviewing quasi-judicial actions, so 
their use leads to useless debate over whether quasi-judicial or administrative action is 
involved. Quo warranto is proper only for questioning the right to hold office, not offi-
cial misconduct or the legality of a particular action. The limitations on the standard of 
review inherent in the form of action make the general utility theory more attractive. 
158. See text accompanying note 236 infra. 
159. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). 
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trative process allows such a great variety in procedure. Fortunately, order is 
restored by the grouping of similar types of procedure. 
Basic order in the administrative law system comes from two major pro-
cedural distinctions: the distinction between adjudication and rulemaking, and 
the distinction between formal, or trial-like procedures and other methods for 
gathering information and incorporating participation.180 Most administrative 
decisionmaking processes are either rulemaking or adjudication. From these 
two basic distinctions, administrative law has divided administrative activities 
into four categories: formal adjudication, informal adjudication, formal 
rulemaking, and informal rulemaking.181 Distinctions between these categories 
are sometimes vague; this is especially true when making borderline distinc-
tions. Nonetheless, the categories offer an analytically sound system, which 
becomes the foundation for analyzing procedural questions in administrative 
law. The judicial role in the administrative process is affected by the nature of 
the four fundamental processes, because each tends to produce a distinct type 
of record for review. 
Although an administrative program may use any of the four processes, 
judicial review tends to be designed around the concept of a formal, trial-like 
proceeding. Appellate courts are accustomed to reviewing formal records both 
from courts below and from formal adjudicative processes in agencies. Not 
only do appellate courts traditionally review trial-like records, but the mechan-
ics of appellate review incorporate the notion of a formal record. The Judicial 
Code, in its list of items which should be in an administrative record, clearly 
contemplates evidence and other materials of the type produced in a formal 
adjudicative proceeding.182 The history and interpretations of the provision re-
160. An adjudication is any agency action which decides individual rights or du-
ties. See generally Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 
353 (I 978). Rulemaking is action of a general nature that is substantially prospective 
in impact. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 246 (1973). Some 
agency functions, such as data-gathering, fall outside these categories. Advice-giving, 
however, is auxiliary and perhaps related to rulemaking and adjudication. See Sinai 
Hosp. v. Horvitz, 621 F.2d 1267, 1269 (4th Cir. 1980). 
Formal procedures equate to a bench trial. S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 
61 (1941). Although informal procedures and trial procedures share some elements, 
they are significantly different. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 
43 U. CHI. L. REv. 739, 739 n.1 (1976); Williams, ''Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the 
Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 
401, 401-02 (1975). The informality varies considerably. Social Security Administra-
tion adjudications, for example, remain technically informal despite their many trial-
like elements. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339 (1976); Richardson v. 
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400 (1971). 
161. Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1160 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980); S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 
267 (1946). 
162. 23 U.S.C. § 2112 (1982). The Administrative Procedure Act defines formal 
records in 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (1982); see also MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE ACT, § 9(e) (1961), 14 U.L.A. 404 (1980). 
224 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
inforce this narrow perception of the kind of information package or record 
which is to be presented for review.163 The system is designed for, and the 
judges are accustomed to handling, only one type of !ldministrative record. 
When faced with an administrative record produced by formal adjudica-
tion/6' a reviewing court can be relatively confident in its ability to test the 
correctness of the administrative decision. The proceeding is dominated by 
questions about specific facts. Trial procedures are particularly suited to the 
resolution of specific facts, and the reviewing court has the kind of information 
it needs to hold the agency to a standard requiring a relatively high 
probability of correctness. For this reason, the system traditionally holds deci-
sions resulting from formal1 trial-like administrative process to the reasonable-
ness standard, usually expressed as substantial evidence.1611 
Administrative proceedings, however, rarely produce a record totally com-
patible with a trial court's reco~d. Even the formal administrative hearing pro-
cess, which creates a record similar in form to a trial court record, sends to the 
reviewing court a variation on that form. The court, for example, may face a 
record with written "evidence,"166 information which would not have passed 
the admissibility screen if presented in a judicial trial, 167 or a decision based 
on no admissible evidence at all.168 Thus, even trial-type procedures require a 
reviewing court to conduct review on a record which deviates from the record 
coming from a lower court. Nonetheless, the content and quality of the formal 
163. S. REP. No. 2129, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3996, 3997. 
164. See 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1982). 
165. !d. § 706(2)(E). The APA requires substantial evidence review for all deci-
sions made through §§ 556-557 procedures. These are trial-like procedures required in 
formal adjudication and formal rulemaking. This provision expresses the law at the 
time of the passage of the APA, MANUAL, supra note 3, at 109, and continues to 
represent the accepted theory. 
166. Various agencies have adopted summary judgment procedures for decisions 
which must be made on a record after opportunity for agency hearing. These proce-
dures use mostly written evidence and limit oral presentation to disputed issues of ma-
terial fact that cannot be resolved in a written record. VI SENATE COMM. ON GoVERN· 
MENT AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 36 {1977); 
Ames & McCracken, Framing Regulatory Standards to Avoid Formal Adjudication: 
The FDA as a Case Study, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 14 (1976); Gellhorn & Robinson, Sum-
mary Judgment in Administrative Adjudication, 84 HARV. L. REV. 612 (1971). 
167. In formal adjudication, "[a]ny oral or documentary evidence may be re-
ceived, but the agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, 
immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence." 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) {1982). It has long 
been established that an agency may admit into even a formal record information com-
monly relied upon by reasonable, prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs. 
NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d. 862, 873 (2d Cir. 1938); 1 K. DAVIS, supra 
note 1, §§ 14.01-.17. 
168. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). Federal courts have tradi-
tionally rejected the residuum rule, which requires a residuum of corroborative evi-
dence admissible in court in order to withstand the substantial evidence test. K. DAVIS, 
supra note I 04, § 14.11. 
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record is sufficient to hold the agency to a high probability of correctness ex-
pressed by the reasonableness standard. 
Most of the processes producing decisions affecting private citizens do not 
use trial-type procedure and produce a very informal record.169 Courts tradi-
tionally have a great deal of difficulty reviewing such records. The Supreme 
Court has given some guidance in identifying the reviewable record in infor-
mal decisionmaking. The most valuable opinion is the short per curiam Su-
preme Court opinion in Camp v. Pitts.170 The Court laid the foundation for a 
workable concept of the informal agency record: 
[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record al-
ready in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court. 
. . . The validity of the Comptroller's action must, therefore, stand or 
fall on the propriety of that finding, judged, of course, by the appropriate 
standard of review. If that finding is not sustainable on the administrative 
record ... [then it must be remanded].171 
A court is thus instructed to review the compilation of information, 
whatever its form, upon which the agency made its decision. Nonetheless, 
since there is no established, uniform method for creation of informal records, 
there is no uniform structure or content to the record created by informal 
decisionmaking. The reviewing court is presented with a "record" that often 
lacks structure and that may have absorbed, sometimes merely by chance, any 
manner of information. A court faced with the myriad of informal records 
must wrestle with unfamiliar structure and content.172 
A reviewing court is likely to find even more disconcerting the absence of 
the same quality controls which are present in a formal, trial-type record. A 
reviewing court depends on the techniques of trial to screen the information 
which enters the record. For example, rules of relevance keep out extraneous 
information, and rules of admissibility maintain the integrity of the informa-
tion which does enter the record. Devices such as cross-examination test testi-
monial evidence and those such as authentication test documentary evidence. 
The informal process is a conscious compromise of these structural and 
quality controls. The administrative decisionmaker, as well as the court, must 
deal with the same deficiencies in the information-gathering process of infor-
169. Gardner, The Procedures by Which Informal Action is Taken, 24 An. L. 
REv. 155, 156 (1972). For a historical prospective, seeS. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 35 (1941). 
170. 411 U.S. 138 (1973) (per curiam). 
171. Id. at 142-43. 
172. Therefore, in the first instance a reviewing court must rely on the agency's 
submission even where it is not confident in the agency's efforts. Some help is also 
found in that by the time the informal decision has worked its way through the admin-
istrative process, a more structured and loosely identifiable record has been compiled. 
Where the informal record cannot serve the judicial review function, the Supreme 
Court has authorized lower courts to request affidavits or to call officials to testify. 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). 
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mal procedures. The administrative decisionmaker must come to the best pos-
sible conclusions based on these records. Therefore, the court cannot review 
this information under· a test which calls for a high probability that the 
agency's decision is correct. Review of decisions reached through informal pro-
cedures is traditionally subjected to the arbitrariness standard.173 
A lesser demand for correctness, and the commensurate lowering of the 
standard of review, is justified by the advantages perceived in informal pro-
ceedings.174 Otherwise, it would be ironic that less judicial scrutiny is afforded 
the very agency actions which demand less of the initial decisionmaker. Infor-
mal procedures compromise some procedural guarantees of correctness in 
favor of other advantages. and the review system must comport with those 
compromises. 
Informal adjudication, for example, may involve issues similar to those 
which often appear in court, e.g., adjudicative facts, but the judicial model has 
been rejected for other reasons. It may be that the creators of the program 
sought to avoid the cumbersome judicial model at the agency level, and that it 
should not be built back into the process at the review stage. In such proceed-
ings, the courts avoid this result by limiting their review to assuring against an 
unacceptably high risk of error. Thus, the limited function of the courts ex-
pressed by the arbitrariness standard is consistent with the original provision 
for a nonjudicialized decisionmaking.176 
Rulemaking procedures similarly incorporate goals other than factfinding 
which the review system must take into account. The system must include, for 
example, an affirmative effort to gain broad public participation-something 
which is impossible for the judicial process. 
Rulemaking, particularly informal rulemaking,176 creates an amorphous 
and undistilled record-a record filled with questionable facts and loose opin-
ions. The information package created during rulemaking presents the review-
173. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Economic Dev. Ass'n, 624 F.2d 136, 139 (lOth Cir. 
1980). 
174. E.g., Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical 
and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness and Timeliness in the 
Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 783-91 (1974); 
Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through 
a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 60, 84-87 (1976). 
175. These cases probably do not need extensive factual development. Judge 
Friendly has observed: 
Except for administrative appeal or judicial review, there would seem to be no 
need for any "record" in the typical mass justice case; the facts are simple 
enough that the hearing officer can render a decision on the basis of his recol-
lection and notes, as is done in England. Even administrative appeal or judi-
cial review would not require a transcript; for centuries appeals were heard on 
the judge's notes. 
Friendly, supra note 93, at 1291-92. 
176. 5 u.s.c. § 553 {1982). 
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ing court with a record that it is particularly uncomfortable with.177 Because 
the APA requires courts to review the whole record/78 a court reviewing 
rulemaking is responsible for the entire unstructured mass which makes up the 
rulemaking record.179 Even through more formal procedures, such as "hybrid 
rulemaking," rulemaking still creates records with information which is not 
tested by the procedural devices of trial.180 The nonjudicial nature of rulemak-
ing records has therefore caused problems for reviewing courts. Courts have, 
however, generally managed to review them.181 The nature of the factfinding 
177. Association of Nat'! Advertisers v. FfC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (I 980); Bradford Nat'! Clearing Corp. v. SEC, 590 
F.2d 1085, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Aqua Slide 'n' Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 565 F.2d 831, 
837 (5th Cir. 1978) ("record in this case is a jumble"); 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 148, §§ 
6:5-:6. 
178. 5 u.s.c. § 706(2) (I 982). 
179. Appellate courts have long accepted responsibility for reviewing records ac-
cumulated through informal rulemaking. This issue was faced squarely in the contro-
versy over whether direct review to the appellate courts was available for informal 
rulemaking records that were not adequate for appellate consideration. In United Gas 
Pipeline v. FPC, 181 F.2d 796, 798-99 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950), 
the court held that direct review was not available for informal rulemaking. Later, 
however, the circuit changed its mind and direct review of rulemaking became the 
firmly established practice. Currie & Goodman, supra note 157, at 39-40; Verkuil, 
Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185, 196-205 (1974). 
Administrative law is learning more about the "rulemaking record." Professor Da-
vis has accomplished a good deal in developing this understanding. See 1 K. DAVIS, 
supra note 148, § 6:10. 
The latest revision of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act, § 3-112(c) 
(I 98 I), specifically permits review to stray beyond the official rulemaking record. 14 
U.L.A. 102 (Supp. 1984). 
180. Much of the thinking about this problem began with the Magnuson-Moss 
provision for FfC rulemaking. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commis-
sion Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 109, 88 Stat. 2183, 2189 (1974) (current 
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-58 (1982)). It defines the "hybrid" record created by those 
procedures: "'[R]ulemaking record' means the rule, its statement of basis and purpose, 
the transcript [of any oral presentation, and cross-examination in an informal hearing], 
any written submissions, and any other information which the Commission considers 
relevant to such rule." 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(I)(B) (1982). Of course there is nothing 
"hybrid" about this record; it is simply a larger informal rulemaking record with a 
portion of the written material appearing as transcript. 
Unlike formal adjudication, where the person who presides at least issues an initial 
decision, informal rulemaking rarely involves a presiding officer who makes any deci-
sion. Thus, the decision is made on a totally written record, part of which is the written 
memorialization of the oral testimony. 
The Administrative Conference's report on FfC rulemaking, for example, spends 
a good deal of space on the problem of the unstructured and cumbersome rulemaking 
record. BOYER, TRADE REGULATION RULEMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION: A REPORT TO ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES BY THE SPECIAL PROJECT FOR THE STUDY OF RULEMAKING PROCEDURES 
UNDER THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY-FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AcT 
(1979). 
181. The Administrative Conference found that "[c]ompliance with [the] proce-
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in these records, as in informal adjudication, makes the greater tolerance for 
error in arbitrariness review more often appropriate.182 
The objective of rulemaking, however, provides an even more compelling 
reason for weak review. The conclusions reached through rulemaking usually 
go to determinations of policy. Policy questions raise some very special 
problems for the agency and ultimately for a court. Where the conclusions 
involve judgments, they cannot be made with a high level of confidence in 
their correctness, and are not usually amenable to clear demonstrations or 
proof of correctness. Consequently the type of judgments made in rulemaking 
are traditionally subjected to arbitrariness review.183 Moreover, many policy 
conclusions are not by nature of a kind which can be termed correct, for often 
policymaking involves the exercise of true discretion and the courts cannot 
evaluate the conclusions themselves.184 Thus, in reviewing the results of 
rulemaking a court must show considerable restraint, both in accepting a rela-
tively high risk of error on questions involving judgment, and in avoiding sub-
stituting its own discretion for that of the agency. In general, the law sur-
rounding review of decisions made through rulemaking procedures 
incorporates the need for this restraint.186 
One anomaly in this treatment of rulemaking is the review of nonlegisla-
tive rules, such as interpretative rules and general statements of policy. Non-
legislative rulemaking is an expression of an agency's inherent authority to 
articulate its view of the law under its charge.186 Such rulemaking, unlike leg-
dural requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553 ... will ordinarily produce a record adequate to 
the purpose of judicial review." The Choice of Forum for Judicial Review of Adminis-
trative Action, I C.F.R. § 305.75-3 (1983). For an excellent treatment of the proce-
dural alternative open to a court reviewing rulemaking, see Gifford, Administrative 
Rulemaking and Judicial Review: Some Conceptual Models, 65 MINN. L. REV. 63 
(I 980). 
Although courts of appeals have declined jurisdiction to review interpretative rules 
promulgated without notice and comment procedure because there is no administrative 
record to review, National Ass'n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., 489 F.2d 1268, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1974), there is no reason why the doc-
trine of Camp v. Pitts would not apply to interpretative rules. 
182. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. 
Ct. 2856, 2866-67 (1983). 
183. Formal rulemaking, a procedure decreasing in popularity, is generally sub-
jected to substantial evidence or reasonableness review. See 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(E) 
(I 982). While the record is more like that of a trial, although somewhat less managea-
ble, see Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The 
Need of Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 
1276, 1291-92 (1972), the issues involved are not the kind that can be tested to a high 
probability of correctness. Thus, formal rulemaking also should be subjected to arbi-
trariness review. 
184. See text accompanying notes 240-51 infra. 
185. Due to the type of issues which dominate rulemaking, most formal rulemak-
ing must also be subjected to very limited review. 
186. Koch, Public Procedures for the Promulgation of Interpretative Rules and 
General Statements of Policy, 64 GEO. L.J. 1047, 1048-50 (1976). 
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islative rulemaking, is not based on a delegated authority to make rules. It is 
essentially a device whereby the agency can disclose its interpretations of its 
law. Such rulemaking need not involve any public participation and is not re-
quired to comply with the procedures designed for that purpose.187 Courts 
must subject nonlegislative rules to de novo or agreement review and are free 
to substitute their judgment for rules they find incorrect.188 Nonlegislative 
rules are not an extension of legislative authority and do not have the force of 
law. Courts must recognize, however, that the predominant issues are the 
same in nonlegislative and legislative rulemaking. All rulemaking, for exam-
ple, involves some policymaking. The review system, therefore, demands that 
the courts show great restraint in reviewing policy conclusions no matter what 
form of proceeding is under review.189 The current system has compromised 
these conflicting concepts by admonishing the courts to show great deference 
to the agency's nonlegislative rules even though they are operating under the 
agreement review standard.190 
Looking at the whole review system, it is clear that the type of agency 
procedure should and does affect the type of review. The due process explo-
sion,191 however, has confused judicial review because it has forced courts to 
review nontraditional forms of administrative "records." The structure and 
quality of the record presented to the reviewing court necessarily affects judi-
cial responsibility.192 Courts are accustomed to screening devices, such as rules 
of relevancy and admissibility, which structure the record and give it form. 
Administrative procedures, however, rarely produce this type of record. 
Agency records often deviate substantially from trial records.193 Nonetheless, 
agency records must perform the same function as that performed by a tradi-
tional record. Thus, it is essential that judges understand the concept of the 
agency record and the effect of the informal administrative processes on the 
record presented to a reviewing court.194 
187. ld. 
188. Id. at 1050-51. 
189. See text accompanying notes 240-51 infra. 
190. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
191. Friendly, supra note 93, at 1268. 
192. McGowan, Judicial Review of Agency Action, 20 AD. L. REv. 147, 180 
(1967); see Leventhal, Nature and Scope of Judicial Review, in C. CHRISTENSEN & R. 
MIDDLEKAUF, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 293, 298 
(1977). 
193. See Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product 
Safety Act, 20 UCLA L. REv. 899, 933-34 (1973) (Consumer Product Safety Act 
makes the term "'record' include that which in lawyerly and even common parlance 
would more precisely be described by the term 'non-record' "). 
194. Choice of sanctions or remedies has been subjected to limited review, no 
matter what standard is applied to the primary decisionmaking process. Niagara Mo-
hawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Wise v. United States, 
603 F.2d 182, 191-92 (Ct. Cl. 1979). Nevertheless, there are limits. See National Nu-
tritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 504 F.2d 761, 786 (2d Cir. 1974) (FDA regulations 
invalidated as unreasonable), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 (1975). 
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Increased variety in agency procedures, however, further decreases the 
utility of process analysis in determining the proper scope of review. The pro-
cedures of a particular agency program and the records produced must be 
considered together in determining the proper scope of judicial review. Exami-
nation of the procedures used by the agency alone is much too imprecise an 
approach to establish the proper scope of review. The inadequacies of the pro-
cedural approach have caused confusion as to the proper role of the judiciary 
in several administrative programs, and have forced courts to look for more 
precise tools for discovering the proper level of review. 
2. Inadequacies in Defining the Judicial Role According to the Process 
Despite the increasing understanding of the less traditional forms of 
records, courts have been very inflexible in developing a new understanding of 
their review responsibilities with respect to the new procedures. Even the best 
judges have questioned the utility of the present standards of review system 
when they are confronted with nontraditional records. Several judges have 
suggested that the informal or nonevidentiary nature of some administrative 
records virtually destroys the utility of distinguishing different standards of 
review.195 
The traditional theory is that the proper standard for review of informal 
records should be arbitrariness196 and that the substantial evidence test should 
be limited to formal records. There is some logic in this theory because, taken 
literally, the phrase "substantial evidence" review demands evidence and 
thereby contemplates a formal record.197 Such review is logically impossible 
when an informal record contains no "evidence" and, hence, judges have had 
difficulty applying the standard to informal records. The difficulty has drawn 
some judges into ignoring the real, rather than semantic, differences among 
the standards; they do not see that the major function of the standards is to 
communicate the correct intensity of review, not to establish the type of infor-
mation the court should demand. 
The structure of the record, therefore, cannot be the major factor that 
defines the appropriate level of review. The evolution of a sound review system 
195. E.g., Associated Indus. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 
1973): 
[W]hile we applied to F.C.C. rulemaking the "arbitrary and capricious" stan-
dard of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), it is hard to see in what respect we would have 
treated the question differently if we had been applying a "substantial evi-
dence" test. . . . While we still have a feeling that there may be cases where 
an adjudicative determination not supported by substantial evidence. . . 
would not be regarded as arbitrary or capricious,. . . in the review of rules of 
general applicability made after notice and comment rulemaking, the two cri-
teria do tend to converge. 
!d. at 349-50; see Scalia & Goodman, supra note 193, at 935 n.l38. 
196. See text accompanying note 173 supra. 
197. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 148, at 468. 
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demands the flexibility to apply various standards to test different processes 
and different information packages. The type of process which produces the 
record and the nature of the information package itself affects the way the 
reviewing court applies these standards, but they do not affect the judgment as 
to the proper intensity of review. The court must understand the limitations of 
the record created by each type of administrative process and apply the stan-
dard best suited to these limitations. Nonetheless, these review standards have 
meaning independent of the form of the administrative process or the record to 
which they are applied. It would be a substantial step backwards if courts 
abandoned the present law about review merely because judges sometimes feel 
uncomfortable with an agency record presented for review. 
As we have seen, reasonableness review usually applies only to the results 
of formal proceedings.198 Congress has in recent times, however, prescribed 
reasonableness review for both informal adjudication and informal rulemak-
ing.199 Courts cannot ignore these instructions simply because they are unac-
customed to carrying them out in the context of informal action. Nonetheless, 
courts often refuse to apply the mandated level of review, or they have im-
posed a record requirement not intended by Congress merely because they 
face inconsistent instruction.200 
More agile judicial minds can accommodate reasonableness review of in-
formal records.201 Perhaps it is unfortunate that Congress chooses the term 
"substantial evidence" to communicate reasonableness review for informal de-
cisions. Nevertheless, courts have shown that they can simply focus on the 
reasonableness element underlying the instruction and decide whether the 
agency's conclusions are reasonable based on the information package used by 
the agency in making the decision. These courts recognize that the substantial 
evidence standard is an effort by Congress to require a relatively high 
probability of correctness as opposed to the less probing arbitrariness review 
otherwise applied to informal records.202 There appears to be no reason why a 
reviewing court cannot apply the reasonableness standard to informal records. 
198. MANUAL, supra note 3, at 109. 
199. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(3) (1982) (Federal Trade Commission rulemak-
ing); id. § 717r(b) (substantial evidence provision of the Natural Gas Act applies to 
informal rulemaking); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976) (informal adjudication by Social Se-
curity Administration). Nevertheless, the fact that an agency imposes formal proce-
dures on rulemaking through its own procedural rules does not compel substantial evi-
dence review. Automobile Club of N.Y., Inc. v. Cox, 592 F.2d 658, 664 (2d Cir. 1979); 
MANUAL, supra note 3, at 108-09. 
200. E.g., Association of Bank Travel Bureaus, Inc. v. Board of Governors of 
Fed. Reserve Sys., 568 F.2d 549, 552 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1978); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 
483 F.2d 1238, 1258-60, 1262-63 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
201. E.g., D.D. Bean & Sons v. CPSC, 574 F.2d 643 (1st Cir. 1978); Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842, 850-52 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 
(1973). 
202. Aqua Slide 'n' Dive v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 837 (5th Cir. 1978); see 
Wright, supra note 49, at 391-92. 
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For example, Judge Tamm, in a challenge to an FAA finding that a tele-
vision antenna would not be a hazard to aviation, found that "the informal 
adjudication procedures employed by the FAA created a record which con-
tains substantial evidence supporting the no-hazard decision."203 The hazard 
determination procedures specifically excluded application of trial-type adver-
sarial hearing procedures,204 but the statute provided that "findings of fact by 
the [FAA], if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive."2011 The 
FAA argued for the application of the "less rigorous arbitrary and capricious 
standard" because of the absence of a formal record.206 Substantial evidence 
review, the FAA maintained, was inappropriate where the record for review 
lacked the internal integrity ensured by a quasi-judicial hearing process.207 
The court found, however, that it could undertake substantial evidence review 
of the informal record and thereby had no trouble finding that the FAA's 
conclusions were "reasonable and well supported in the record before us. "208 
No matter what kind of record is presented for review, a court can determine 
whether the agency's factual conclusions are reasonable, provided that all of 
the information which the agency actually used is presented to the reviewing 
court.2os 
Any of the types of review can be applied to any form of administrative 
action. Certain types of review are more compatible with certain records. Such 
general compatibility provides some guide to the type of review required in a 
particular administrative program, but it is inadequate to provide the final an-
swer. Conclusions about the level of review, then, must remain independent of 
the type of procedure or information package presented to the court. 
B. The Judicial Role According to the Type of Issue Under Review 
The nature of the process is an imprecise method for communicating or 
determining the appropriate type of review. No matter what kind of informa-
tion package or what issues may be expected to dominate a particular type of 
proceeding, the result will be a combination of several types of issues. Effective 
review must approach each type of issue differently. 
203. Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. FAA, 600 F.2d 965, 966 (D.C. Cir. 
1979). 
204. /d. at 970. 
205. 49 U.S.C. § l486(e) (1976). 
206. 600 F.2d at 969. 
207. /d. at 970. 
208. /d. at 973. 
209. Under the APA, substantial evidence review requires "whole record" re-
view, but the whole record provision of§ 706 applies to all the standards. Thus, reason-
ableness or arbitrariness review cannot be distinguished as to whether one or the other 
requires whole record review. The record may vary according to the formality of the 
proceeding, but it does not vary with the standard of review. Controversy over whether 
there is any real distinction, beyond the structure of the record, in the existing stan-
dards suggests that further breakdown in the degrees of judicial involvement would not 
be worthwhile. 
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In order to make the modern review system work, the conclusion about 
the level of review drawn from the type of agency proceeding must be refined 
according to the various types of issues which led to the decision. In finding its 
role, a court must look beyond the type of record and segregate the various 
issues involved in the decision. A reviewing court must be prepared to contrib-
ute differently to the resolution of issues of fact, policy, law, procedure, and 
constitutionality, and its review function must be broken down according to 
these categories.210 
1. Facts 
Factual conclusions are generally reviewed under either a reasonableness 
or arbitrariness standard.211 Courts are rarely authorized to conduct de novo 
factfinding or to substitute judgment on questions of fact. The term "substan-
tial evidence" is often used to communicate the reasonableness review instruc-
tion. The phrase "arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discretion" is used to com-
municate arbitrariness review. If the enabling act is silent, the APA requires 
reasonableness review only where the facts are found in a formal proceed-
ing.212 The presumption is that the intended standard for review of informal 
factfinding is arbitrariness. 
Although the type of proceeding is traditionally used to determine the 
proper level of factual review, the court should look beyond the type of proce-
dure and focus on the kind of facts under review. Review of adjudicative facts 
should differ from review of legislative facts.213 Adjudicative facts, whether 
210. COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, ABA, FINAL 
DRAFT OF STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS 98-100 (1977) ("The func-
tion of the courts in judicial review can be classified . . . by distinguishing the types of 
questions that may be involved."). The distinguishable issues identified in the Commis-
sion's report are law, policy, fact, and procedure. 
211. See K. DAVIS, supra note 104, at 647. 
212. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982). 
213. Professor Davis has defined the two as follows: 
When a court or an agency finds facts concerning the immediate par-
ties-who did what, where, when, how and with what motive or intent-[it] is 
performing an adjudicative function, and the facts are conveniently called ad-
judicative facts. When a court or an agency develops law or policy, it is acting 
legislatively;. . . and the facts which inform the tribunal's legislative judg-
ment are called legislative facts. 
. . . Legislative facts are ordinarily general and do not concern the im-
mediate parties. 
2 K. DAVIS, supra note I, at 353. The most overlooked word in the this statement is 
"conveniently." This distinction is not proposed as suggesting hard line categories but 
as a convenient way to analyze what experience shows are two varieties of facts in each 
legally related decision. Some facts are clearly of a nature consistent with the adjudica-
tive fact category and others with the legislative fact category. It is freely admitted 
there are facts which do not clearly fall into either. By using this distinction in answer-
ing scope of review questions, we can limit the argument by excluding the clear cases 
and concentrating on the cases at the margin. 
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developed in a formal or informal adjudication, should be subjected to the 
higher demand for accuracy embodied in reasonableness review. They are cen-
tral to determinations of individual rights or duties, and hence take on a spe-
cial importance. Adjudicative facts are facts that can be proven and thereby 
evaluated for correctness.214 Nevertheless, reasonableness review does not 
mean that these facts necessarily must be proved through technical evidence. 
Both judicial and official notice permit the notice and comment approach to a 
vast amount of adjudicative facts which enter an administrative record,216 and 
the summary judgment, or "modified procedure," approach to adjudication 
can lead to findings of adjudicative fact on written records.216 
Adjudicative facts are not usually subjected to reasonableness review 
when they are found in an informal proceeding. The APA provides for reason-
ableness review only where such findings are made in section 556 and 557 
proceedings.217 Most enabling acts which set up informal adjudications do not 
provide for substantial evidence, or reasonableness, review.218 Since the APA 
does not affirmatively deal with review of facts on informal records, courts 
might be free to evolve a doctrine which generally requires reasonableness re-
view of adjudicative facts without regard to the type of process, unless specifi-
cally precluded by statute, legislative intent, or the needs of the administrative 
scheme. 
Legislative facts,219 on the other hand, should generally be subjected to 
arbitrariness review. They are not facts that can be "proved" in the traditional 
sense, and they cannot be reviewed in the same manner as provable facts.220 
Conclusions about legislative facts by their nature cannot stand up to a test for 
a high probability of correctness. Moreover, legislative facts usually involve 
questions in which the agency's judgment deserves a stronger presumption of 
regularity. 221 
Review instructions, however, do not separate the two types of facts. The 
APA requires reasonableness review for all facts found in a formal proceeding, 
214. Jd. 
215. See FED. R. Evm. 201. 
216. See IV SENATE COMM. ON GovERNMENT AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG. 1sT SEss., 
STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION 57 (1977). 
217. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982). 
218. But see MANUAL, supra note 3, at 109: "It will be noted that this codified 
substantial evidence rule is made applicable not only to cases governed by ... [§§ 
556-557], but also to those types of cases in which statutes provide for agency hearings, 
but which are exempted from ... [§§ 556-557] by the introductory clause of ... [§ 
554]." 
219. See note 213 supra. 
220. See AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 650-51 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated 
and remanded, 449 U.S. 809 (1980); Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 
931, 938 (1980). 
221. SeeWald, Making "Informed" Decisions in the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 135, 153 (1982) (the difficulty of review of legislative 
facts, e.g., scientific or technical facts, might be overcome by more judicial factfinding). 
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and most enabling acts follow the same pattern. Obedient courts might try to 
apply reasonableness review to both adjudicative and legislative facts, but 
some courts do seem as a practical matter to review legislative facts differ-
ently.222 A better review system might give them more freedom to do so. 
Although courts are usually told to review facts under either a reasona-
bleness or arbitrariness standard, they sometimes may be instructed to do 
agreement or de novo review of facts. Under such instructions, a court be-
comes the ultimate factfinder because it can substitute its judgment for that of 
the agency.223 Agreement review of facts is disfavored in the administrative 
process.224 Agreement review to some extent requires the courts to duplicate 
factfinding performed by the agency. If the courts are better factfinders in a 
given context, then they should be assigned to the task in the first instance. If 
the agency is assigned factfinding, then the courts should not redo the agency's 
work. 
Because agreement review of facts usually misallocates judicial resources, 
it should be undertaken only when the legislature clearly demands it. Both the 
Constitution and common law, however, sometimes require agreement or de 
novo review of facts. Thus, if such review is not provided for in the statute, or 
even if Congress attempts to provide for less review, persons challenging cer-
tain agency action can insist under this authority on de novo judicial consider-
ation as a matter of constitutional right. 
In a 1920 opinion, Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough,225 the 
Supreme Court found a right to de novo review for cases involving "constitu-
tional facts." The Court held that when someone in a ratemaking_ proceeding 
222. See, e.g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981) 
(FCC's judgment on "public interest" entitled to substantial judicial deference); AFL-
CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 648-52 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (even where substantial evi-
dence review is authorized, the court should do less rigorous review of general or policy 
oriented facts), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 809 (1980); EDF v. EPA, 598 F.2d 
62, 83-85 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (reviewing courts should give less scrutiny to agency influ-
ences from available data and existing knowledge); Bradford Nat'! Clearing Corp. v. 
SEC, 590 F.2d 1085, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (even where substantial evidence review is 
authorized, "a wide range of conclusions [as to "future-oriented facts"] will inevitably 
lie within the range of reasonable nonarbitrary choice"); Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 
F.2d 722, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Where ... the regulations turn on choices of policy, 
on an assessment of risks, or on predictions dealing with matters on the frontiers of 
scientific knowledge, we will demand adequate reasons and explanations but not 'find-
ings' of the sort familiar from the world of adjudication."). 
223. Courts reviewing administrative decisions are not generally authorized to 
substitute judgment on issues of fact and policy. See ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 
1153, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1980); L. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 620-21; M. REDISH, supra 
note 107, at 35, 45. As Professor Jaffe has suggested, the difference here might be that 
the court will not exercise discretion which should be given the agency, MANUAL, supra 
note 3, at 108, but it can express judgments which otherwise might have been given to 
an agency. The difference is discussed in section III infra. 
224. Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 619 n.17 (1966); United States v. Carlo 
Bianchi & Co. 373 U.S. 709, 715 (1963); MANUAL, supra note 3, at 109-10. 
225. 253 u.s. 287 (1920). 
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"claims [a] confiscation of his property will result, the State must provide a 
fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for determina-
tion upon its own independent judgment as to both law and facts; otherwise 
the order is void because in conflict with the due process clause .... "220 
Sixteen years later, in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,221 the 
Court expanded on the sketchy reasoning in Ben Avon. The Court viewed 
ratemaking as a legislative function for which there was generally very limited 
review. When the legislature delegated the power to set utility rates, it con-
ferred on the agency powers the legislature could exercise and thereby empow-
ered the agency to act as its agent with the same limited degree of judicial 
supervision. Because the agency was acting in the place of legislature, review 
was by necessity limited to review similar to that of legislative action. "But the 
Constitution fixes limits to the ratemaking power by prohibiting the depriva-
tion of property without due process of law or the taking of private property 
for public use without just compensation."228 Because the courts are always 
the final arbiters of constitutional questions, the Court found that review of 
facts contributing to the resolution of constitutional questions cannot be lim-
ited: "Legislative declaration or finding is necessarily subject to independent 
judicial review upon the facts and the law by courts of competent jurisdiction 
to the end that the Constitution as the supreme law of the land may be main-
tained."229 The Court noted that even in this review a court should not ignore 
the administrative record or reasoning, and that a court should only interfere 
in the administrative judgment where the complaining party meets its burden 
of "making a convincing showing."230 
A second line of early cases established constitutional right to de novo 
review for "jurisdictional facts." Justice Brandeis, in Ng Fung Ho v. White, 231 
found that "[j]urisdiction in the executive to order deportation exists only if 
the person arrested is an alien. The claim of citizenship is thus a denial of an 
essential jurisdictional fact."232 Questions of "jurisdictional facts" were 
thereby opened to de novo review. Because it found citizenship so fundamen-
tal, the Court in Ng Fung Ho required the entire case to be retried by the 
reviewing court, whereas Ben Avon and St. Joseph only expanded the scope of 
judicial review to allow the court to make an independent judgment on issues 
of "constitutional facts." Another classic case, Crowell v. Benson,233 carried 
the jurisdictional fact rationale beyond the sensitive area of deportation and 
loss of citizenship. The longshoremen workers' compensation legislation re-
quired that the injury occur within the course of employment on navigable 
226. Id. at 289. 
227. 298 u.s. 38 (1936). 
228. Id. at 51. 
229. Id. at 51-52; see Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1690 & n.lO (1983). 
230. 298 U.S. at 53. 
231. 259 u.s. 276 (1922). 
232. Id. at 284. 
233. 285 u.s. 22 (1932). 
1984] ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 237 
waters. The Court held these elements to be jurisdictional facts which required 
the case to be retried by reviewing courts.234 
Both the "constitutional fact" and the "jurisdictional fact" notions, how-
ever, generated adverse comment. There was particular concern that the judi-
cial branch was injecting itself too much into the administrative process. Con-
sequently, except for the citizenship area carved out by Ng Fung Ho, 
constitutionally mandated de novo review has virtually disappeared in federal 
administrative litigation and rarely finds acceptance in state courts.235 
In Overton Park, the Supreme Court established the basic formula for the 
nonconstitutional inference of de novo review authority: 
De novo review of whether the Secretary's decision was "unwarranted by the 
facts" is authorized by § 706 (2)(F) in only two circumstances. First, such de 
novo review is authorized when the action is adjudicatory in nature and the 
agency factfinding procedures are inadequate. And, there may be independent 
judicial factfinding when issues that were not before the agency are raised in 
a proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory agency action . 
. . . Neither situation exists here.238 
This language should not be read too literally. It cannot mean that de 
novo judicial consideration is required in every case where the "agency 
factfinding procedures are inadequate" because that would compel de novo 
review in numerous administrative proceedings. The adequacy of the proce-
dures is one of the most prevalent reasons for rejecting agency action. It must 
mean that judicial factfinding will be required wherever the agency does not 
have the authority to establish adequate factfinding procedures. Where the 
court finds that the agency factfinding is inadequate but that the agency has 
the procedural authority to correct the inadequacy, then the court's proper 
function is to return the matter to the agency with instructions as to how to 
correct the inadequacy. Only where such a demand would involve the agency 
in a procedure which it is not authorized to perform should the court under-
take the necessary de novo proceeding. This is consistent with the second cir-
cumstance in which factual questions arise in the "nonadjudicatory" proceed-
ing where such a nonadjudicative process could not deal with the facts. The 
Overton Park decision would have a court provide its own adjudicative process 
as the only alternative. Neither circumstance happens very often. 
Except in these rare circumstances, the assignment to undertake de novo 
review should come from legislation. Several specific statutes do in fact require 
de novo review.237 Experience indicates that there should be no across-the-
234. ld. at 60-64. 
235. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, § 224. One other area in which de novo re-
view may be required is in obscenity, where film review boards decisions must undergo 
a "final judicial determination." Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965); see F. 
SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 151-53 (1976). 
236. 401 U.S. at 415. 
237. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 861-62 (1976). 
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board provision for de novo review of facts.238 Rather, review of factfinding 
should be and usually is either reasonableness or arbitrariness review.239 
2. Policy 
Administrative process grew out of the desire to develop a mechanism for 
effective policymaking.240 It flourished because agencies could be designed for 
the special purpose of making policy in a particular area. Thus, the very exis-
tence of jurisdiction of an agency in a particular area suggests a conscious 
choice to confer policymaking power upon it and not the courts. In order to 
protect this choice, the law admonishes courts to restrain themselves when 
faced with policy issues.241 A court with an urge to make policy in the place of 
the agency violates longstanding doctrine.242 
Therefore, the courts have less responsibility with respect to administra-
tive policy than with any other issue. As Judge McGowan concluded: 
What we are entitled to at all events is a careful identification by the Secre-
tary, when his proposed standards are challenged, of the reasons why he 
chooses to follow one course rather than another. Where that choice purports 
to be based on the existence of certain determinable facts, the Secretary must, 
in form as well as substance, find those facts from evidence in the record. By 
the same token, when the Secretary is obliged to make policy judgments 
where no factual certainties exist or where facts alone do not provide the an-
swer, he should so state and go on to identify the considerations he found 
persuasive. 243 
Policy judgments by their very nature are not decisions that can be made with 
great confidence of correctness.244 Review of policy judgments must allow for 
238. See Woodward & Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of 
Agency Action, 31 Ao. L. REv. 329 (1979). But see Discussion, supra note 7 (R. Neu-
stadt), reprinted in 32 Ao. L. REv. at 303 (pointing out certain advantages to statuto-
rily directed judicial review). 
239. De novo review also differs from the other standards of review in the rem-
edy available if the court finds against the agency. Unlike the other standards, a court 
doing de novo review of a particular issue can substitute its conclusion for that of the 
agency, whereas under the other standards, the court must return the decision to the 
agency for the agency to r.ectify the deficiencies. 
240. See L. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 612-13. 
241. Elizabethtown Gas Co. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 885, 888 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1978); 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
242. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941) ("Because the 
relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence, 
courts must not enter the allowable area of the Board's discretion and must guard 
against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the 
more spacious domain of policy."). 
243. Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 
see Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Environmental Defense 
Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 82, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
244. Bradford Nat'! Clearing Corp. v. SEC, 590 F.2d 1085, 1110-11 (D.C. Cir. 
1978). 
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a good deal of leeway. The hope for correctness lies in the design of the 
agency's policymaking process, and courts must avoid interfering with the 
workings of that process. 
On the other hand, even though policy is the special providence of the 
agencies, courts are not totally excluded, and policy judgments are rarely 
made unreviewable. Consequently, since the courts should monitor policy 
judgments but should tolerate a high risk of error, the correct standard is usu-
ally arbitrariness. 
Of course many policy decisions do not involve judgments that can be 
weighed against the probability of correctness. Rather, they often involve the 
exercise of pure discretion. Policy is the area where true discretion is most 
likely to be granted, and such discretion necessarily precludes the court from 
evaluating the agency decision. Where the court finds that the policy decision 
is the result of the exercise of pure discretion it should not review the decision 
except to look for those external factors which make up abuse of discretion 
review.245 
In their efforts to avoid usurping administrative policymaking functions, 
courts must analyze every administrative decision under review to separate out 
the policymaking portion. They must not allow commingling of policy with 
other issues to lead them into overstepping their function. After a court has 
identified which elements of a decision involve policymaking, it must assure 
that it reviews for arbitrariness. Where the policy of choice involves true dis-
cretion, the court may not review the actual decision. Even common law 
grants of discretion, such as prosecutorial discretion, allocate to the agency 
policymaking-type discretion. That is why those decisions are traditionally 
held to be unreviewable. 
In short, review of policymaking requires meticulous attention to avoid 
the kind of judicial interference likely to injure the policymaking machinery. 
The law firmly establishes that the courts themselves cannot choose to increase 
their own involvement in policymaking; that area, more than any other, is left 
to the agencies.246 
245. See section II supra. 
246. The Supreme Court's treatment of the agency's cost/benefit analysis may 
ultimately be the most significant aspect of Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983), even though its use of the arbitrari-
ness standard will have the most immediate impact. See text accompanying notes 71-76 
supra. In this case, the Secretary of Transportation rescinded a rule which would have 
required passive restraints in automobiles. He found that the predicted benefits no 
longer outweighed the predicted costs. The Court probably went further in reviewing a 
cost/benefit judgment than it ever had before. Although recognizing that a cost/benefit 
analysis affecting a policy decision must be tested for arbitrariness only, the Court 
nonetheless rejected the Secretary's analysis in this instance. /d. at 2865. As to one 
issue, it found that a prior judgment that the benefits outweighed the costs had not 
been sufficiently explained away. On another issue, it actually disagreed with the 
agency's conclusions and found that the agency had not demonstrated a reasonable 
evaluation of either the costs or the benefits. This finding contributed to the Court's 
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Despite a general theory prohibiting substantial judicial involvement in 
administrative policymaking decisions, Congress can assign higher levels of re-
view when it finds that involvement consistent with the particular administra-
tive scheme. Arbitrariness may be more appropriate in a conceptual sense, but 
in a specific process a different level may be chosen. For example, Congress 
may ask the court to review agency policy judgments for reasonableness and 
not just arbitrariness. It may decide that discretionary decisions should not 
involve the exercise of administrative discretion alone but should include some 
element of judicial discretion. It may even choose redundant evaluation by the 
courts by asking the court to substitute policy judgment where it disagrees 
with the agency. But it is Congress, not the courts, which must choose to in-
crease judicial involvement in policymaking. 
Congress has indirectly raised the standards of review in policymaking in 
recent years by requiring that policy judgments be supported by cost/benefit 
analysis.247 Cost/benefit requirements force the agency to determine whether 
there is a preponderance of benefit in its policy decisions. If regulatory reform 
continues to add this requirement to various administrative schemes, agencies, 
and perhaps ultimately reviewing courts will have to decide whether the costs 
are justified by greater benefits.248 This analysis, in a sense, expresses the slip-
pery "public interest" criteria as a function of attempts at concrete measure-
ment of identifiable costs and benefits in an agency action. In reality it is no 
more than a decisional tool whereby public policy choices are taken apart and 
all the elements are separated and given some concrete value.249 After as 
many elements as feasible are given some concrete and uniform unit of value, 
they can be compared so as to search for a preponderance of benefit. Although 
these values are often imprecise, they force a comparison of public interest 
which is often otherwise finessed. It requires the policymaker to find the 
weight of the identifiable, though often intangible, benefits in favor of a given 
policy, and requires "proof' of the correctness of the policy by a preponder-
ance of identified benefits. 
The incorporation of cost/benefit analysis into an administrative program 
conclusion that the agency action was arbitrary. Id. at 2868. 
247. E.g., Regulatorf Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 603-604 (1982); Executive 
Order 12,291, § 2(b), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 
432 (1982); ("Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to 
society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society; ... "); see Neustadt, 
The Administration's Regulatory Reform Program: An Overview, 32 Ao. L. REV. 129, 
137-42 (1980). 
248. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 506-22 
{1981); Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 652-59 
(1980). 
249. For a very concise treatment of cost/benefit analysis, see L. ANDERSON & 
R. SEITLE, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (1977). There are two basic 
schools-those who call it cost/benefit analysis and those who call it benefit/cost analy-
sis. I tend towards the former and you can draw your own psychological conclusions 
from that. 
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raises new problems for the review system. The judicial function with respect 
to cost/benefit analysis is unclear and still emerging. Courts could be limited 
to assuring that the cost/benefit analysis was conducted correctly, or they 
could be given some role in evaluating the results of the analysis.250 Whatever 
role ultimately emerges, courts must take care not to assume too much author-
ity too quickly. The balancing inherent in cost/benefit analysis should remain 
with the decisionmaker assigned the task until clear evidence indicates a need 
to monitor that decisionmaker. Moreover, the results of the cost/benefit analy-
sis contribute to the ultimate decision, but they do not, in and of themselves, 
constitute the ultimate decision. Many variables, such as morality, democratic 
principles, and economic equality, can also contribute to the decision. Gener-
ally speaking, courts should not get involved in these kinds of considerations, 
and they should not let the apparent objectivity of the cost/benefit analysis 
device draw them into those arenas. The courts at this point should show the 
same restraint in reviewing policy decisions supported by cost/benefit analysis 
that they show toward any policy decision.251 
3. Law 
Issues of law stand at the extreme opposite from issues of policy; the judi-
ciary is the final arbiter of questions of law, and courts are free to substitute 
their judgment on any such questions.252 The court's job in reviewing questions 
250. Even if the benefit/cost analysis is not reviewable, courts will not ignore it. 
See Discussion, supra note 7 (Hon. H. Leventhal), reprinted in 32 Ao. L. REv. at 293. 
Courts are already required to consider whether the benefits of a procedural element 
will outweigh the costs of imposing additional procedures. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
u.s. 319, 335 (1976). 
251. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
103 S. Ct. 2856, 2871 (1983). 
252. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118-19 (1978); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 
380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965); see 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982) ("reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions"). 
The APA specifically authorizes review of questions of law. Section 702(2)(A) 
permits rejection of agency action "not in accordance with law" and § 706(2)(C) per-
mits rejection of agency action "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limita-
tions, or short of statutory right." There does not seem to be any practical difference in 
the two instructions. One could authorize review of compliance with "law" which in-
cludes statutory and common law, and the other merely review of statutory authority. 
If so, does the first's position in the section mean that the drafters intended the degree 
of review commensurate with arbitrariness for violations of law? That interpretation 
seems unlikely. The second may merely establish separate review of jurisdictional type 
issues but, if so, it is redundant because agency action in excess of jurisdiction or au-
thority would not be in accordance with law. Perhaps the "not in accordance with law" 
phrase should be separated from arbitrary, capricious and abuse of discretion. It might 
have its own subsection with language to make clear that it includes excess of jurisdic-
tion and statutory authority. 
On the other hand, the law is very well established that assertions of jurisdiction 
by agencies are given great deference and can only be questioned at the end of the 
administrative process. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 507-09 
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of law is to find the right answer and correct the agency if it is mistaken. Even 
when a court decides that an issue is one of law, however, it still may give 
deference to the agency's view of the law.253 The agency is, after all, inti-
mately familiar with the circumstances surrounding the law, and its view on 
the law is not useless.254 
A court may expand or contract its authority according to the way it 
defines the questions presented. The classic example is NLRB v. Hearst Publi-
cations, lnc.m; The issue there was whether newsboys were "employees" under 
the National Labor Relations Act. The majority found that the question was 
not one of law for it to decide: "[W]here the question is one of specific appli-
cation of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency adminis-
tering the staute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is 
limited."256 The dissent, however, found the same question to be one of law: 
"The question who is an employee, so as to make the statute applicable to 
him, is a question of the meaning of the Act and, therefore, is a judicial and 
not an administrative question."257 
As in the Hearst case, the definitional decision can completely change the 
outcome on close questions of law and fact.258 A reviewing court should find 
its review function by carefully defining the issue involved and should resist 
result-oriented issue definitions.259 The disagreement in Hearst appears to be 
(1943); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 214 (1946). Since 
the jurisdiction cannot be questioned until the final decision, coverage is rarely an im-
portant issue on judicial review. Efforts to prevent agency action where jurisdiction 
does not exist have been futile. 
253. Compare Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Electrical 
Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961) (deference paid to agency interpretation of regula-
tion) with International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979) 
(agency's interpretation of statute may be contradicted by language, purpose, and his-
tory of law). 
254. Indeed, in Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, 613 F.2d 947, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. 
1979), the court admonished the FDA not to treat the statute too literally and to exer-
cise its own powers of interpretation more affirmatively. See B. SCHWARTZ & H. 
WADE, supra note 4, at 70 ("The moral of this story is that the legal mind is often 
more liberal in interpreting statutes than is the official mind. The official instinct is to 
keep well within legal powers and to allow a generous margin for the uncertainty of the 
law."). 
255. 322 u.s. 111 (1944). 
256. Id. at 131. 
257. ld. at 136 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
258. Professor Davis found that the Supreme Court takes two approaches to dis-
tinguishing law and fact: one literal and the other pragmatic. 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, 
§ 30.02. Administrative law theory has massaged the law /fact distinction for genera-
tions. See, e.g., W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, supra note 8, at 307-11. The 
same problem arises in other administrative law systems. B. SCHWARTZ & H. WADE, 
supra note 4, at 159-60. 
259. Even the best judges seem to decide the law /policy or tl)e law /fact question 
at the margin according to their determination of how the decisionmaking responsibil-
ity should be divided. E.g., United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 430-31 
(2d Cir. 1974). 
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an honest conflict over the nature of the relevant issue. Characterizing an issue 
is difficult, and such disagreements are inevitable. Careful attention to the 
type of issue under review, however, is a prerequisite to a successful review 
system. It is crucial that the court derive its review function from an honest 
definition of terms, and not by the amount of review it wants to do, because 
the definitions make the court's review compatible with the entire review sys-
tem. A reviewing court must see that the review system in an administrative 
program assigns functions to it that will make optimum use of its special abili-
ties, just as the program assigns the optimum role to the agency. A program 
does so with more precision if it assigns roles according to types of issues. If 
the program does not do so expressly, a court might refine the review instruc-
tion in a way that will define its role as to types of issues so as to best serve the 
administrative program. A reviewing court cannot stray into ad hoc determi-
nations which ignore the law and the vast experience that make up the judicial 
review system. 
One of the best judicial efforts to define a court's review responsibility 
according to the various categories of issues is Judge McGowan's opinion in 
WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC.260 The court took care to determine whether 
the relevant issues were ones of fact, policy, or law. The case involved the 
FCC's efforts to join the stampede towards deregulation. In a prior case, 
WEFM v. FCC,261 the court held that the FCC should hold a hearing when 
there was a protest of a radio broadcaster's efforts to abandon a distinctive 
programming format. After rulemaking, the FCC issued a policy statement 
disagreeing with WEFM and argued that the public interest in diversity of 
entertainment format would be better served by unregulated competition. The 
FCC maintained that its policy judgment should take precedence over the 
court's and that its policy should not be reversed by the court. The court 
agreed that it had "neither the experience nor the constitutional authority to 
make 'policy' as that word is commonly understood. . . . That role is reserved 
to the Congress, and, within the bounds of delegated authority, to the Com-
mission. But in matters of interpreting the 'law' the final say is constitutionally 
committed to the judiciary."262 While recognizing that the "distinction be-
tween law and policy is never clearcut," it found that resolution of this contro-
versy involved an interpretation of the Communications Act "in which the ju-
dicial word is final. "263 
The court next dealt with the controversy in terms of the possible disa-
greement over factual conclusions. "To the extent that the Commission was 
not questioning this court's legal judgment, but was attempting to demonstrate 
that faulty factual premises underlay that judgment, we agree that it was 
within its competence as an agency better equipped to develop legislative-type 
260. 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 582 (1981). 
261. 506 F.2d 246, 259-60 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en bane). 
262. 610 F.2d at 854-55. 
263. /d. at 855. 
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facts than is this court."264 It found, however, that the factfinding in support 
of the policy statement was inadequate and did not contradict the court's legal 
judgment. The opinion is instructive in the meticulous way the court identified 
and applied its different roles with respect to the different categories of issues. 
It felt free to interpret the law, but, without ignoring the agency, it felt that it 
could not disagree with the agency if the issues were ones of policy. It felt 
constrained by the agency's factual judgment, but free to reject arbitrary 
factfinding. 
In reversing the WNCN Listener's Guild decision, the Supreme Court 
found that the decision to permit the market to decide on program format was 
a question of policy and not of law.265 Thus, it found that the judicial function 
was extremely limited because the question was left to the "broad discretion" 
of the FCC. It said that since the appellate court had conceded "that it pos-
sessed neither the expertise nor the authority to make policy decisions in this 
area," it should have permitted the agency to carry out the function for which 
it was designed. "[W]e recognized [in FCC v. National Citizens Committee 
for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 814 (1978)] that the Commission's decisions 
must sometimes rest on judgment and prediction rather than pure factual de-
terminations. . . . These predictions are within the institutional competence of 
the Commission. Our opinions have repeatedly emphasized that the Commis-
sion's judgment regarding how the public interest is best served is entitled to 
substantial judicial deference."266 Although the Court used "deference" lan-
guage, it meant that if a judgment relates to policy the reviewing court may 
not substitute its judgment but may only perform a very limited monitoring 
function, i.e., arbitrariness review.267 
These two opinions demonstrate that the correct application of the dis-
tinction between legal questions and policy questions has even more impact 
than the distinction between law and fact. Even though the Supreme Court 
disagreed with Judge McGowan's conclusion, it analyzed the question with the 
same issue-designation analysis. The two opinions offer a framework for ana-
lyzing the judicial function according to the issues at stake. In doing so, they 
also show the potency of this approach and its contribution to a sound review 
system. 
4. Procedural Issues 
Procedural issues are just one type of legal issue, and hence a court is 
always free to substitute its judgment on procedure. Courts sometimes talk, 
however, as if the agency's decisions on procedures are binding.268 They view 
264. Id. 
265. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981). 
266. Id. at 594-96. The Court required the same judicial restraint when review-
ing the agency's choice between competing policies. 
267. Id. at 602. 
268. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965). 
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procedural questions as within the sound discretion of the agency, and they 
perceive their review function as very limited. Adequate procedure, however, is 
a legal judgment and must be guaranteed by the courts. Therefore, while a 
court should give the agency's judgment substantial deference on the agency's 
own procedure, and agency procedural judgments should carry a strong pre-
sumption of regularity,269 the court should uphold the agency only if it agrees 
with the agency. 
Review of procedures, which is required by the APA,270 produces incon-
sistent theory and ironic results. Sometimes the judiciary assumes a very ac-
tive role in procedural development, while at other times it is extremely reti-
cent. Procedural due process cases have authorized the courts to completely 
replace the agency's procedural judgment. On the other hand, in the major 
case defining the judicial role in creating procedures, Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Counci/,271 the Supreme 
Court virtually removed the courts from making procedural decisions with lan-
guage that might be construed to apply to all review of all administrative 
processes. 
Vermont Yankee involved judicial authority to add procedures to informal 
rulemaking in order to impose "hybrid" rulemaking. After a hearing, the AEC 
granted the petitioners a license to operate a nuclear power plant. The AEC 
subsequently instituted rulemaking proceedings to deal with the question of 
considering environmental effects and eventually issued a rule relevant to nu-
clear fuel cycles. Respondents appealed the fuel cycle rule and the decision to 
grant a license. The District of Columbia Circuit held that basic notice and 
comment rulemaking was inadequate.272 The Supreme Court reversed. It held 
that courts are not authorized to impose procedures in addition to those pre-
scribed by the APA. The opinion contains language which severely restricts 
judicial authority to develop administrative procedures.273 This language, how-
ever, does not contradict the notion that the reviewing courts can substitute 
judgment on procedural questions. The opinion does not suggest that proce-
dural questions are not open to judicial pronouncement, but it does demand 
that procedural review stay within the law. It only makes the self-evident find-
ing that courts, although free to substitute judgment on questions of law, in-
cluding procedural law, are not free to misapply the law. The lower court in 
Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court found, misinterpreted the law. Section 
553 rulemaking procedure is not a procedural minimum, it said, but the full 
269. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) ("In assessing what process 
is due . . ., substantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the indi-
viduals charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare programs that 
the procedures they have provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of 
individuals."). 
270. 5 u.s.c. § 706(2)(0) (1982). 
271. 435 u.s. 519 (1978). 
272. 547 F.2d at 653. 
273. 435 U.S. at 543-48. 
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procedural requirement under the law.m Thus, it found the lower court mis-
taken as to law-not that the lower court was bound by the agency's proce-
dural judgments. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Steadman v. SEC275 reinforces this 
view. Steadman involved the standard of proof in fraud cases brought in SEC 
administrative proceedings. The Court read the APA as mandating a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard, and held that the lower court was wrong in 
imposing a higher standard of proof. The Court said, however, that had there 
been no congressionally created standard, the court would have been free to 
impose whatever standard it felt was fair, and the lower court, therefore, 
would have been free to substitute judgment on this procedural question. 
Although courts are free to interpret and establish procedural law for 
agencies, they are very reluctant to overturn the agencies' procedural judg-
ments. They have so consistently given substantial deference to the agencies on 
some types of procedural questions that courts feel somewhat constrained in 
reviewing those questions. 
In general, courts will not interfere with an agency's procedural judg-
ments when the agency has made a conscious choice as to which of several 
established procedures would be best in a particular context. On such proce-
dural questions, a reviewing court is harnessed by well-established law. This 
law severely restricts a court, for example, from interfering with the choice 
between rulemaking or adjudication.276 Furthermore, the Supreme Court and 
many commentators have attempted to curb the judicial instinct to engage in 
nice judgments on procedural questions.277 A doctrine of substantial restraint 
has evolved from these attempts in many areas of procedure. 
On the other hand, courts are not restrained by procedural judgments on 
some procedural questions. Courts will, for example, always intervene to en-
sure that the agency followed its own procedural rules or procedures estab-
lished by Congress.278 In addition, when neither Congress nor the agency has 
established adequate procedures, courts will be compelled to demand adequate 
procedures. Thus, where the challenge is to the adequacy of the opportunity to 
be heard in a particular context, the courts can be expected to give the ques-
tion very thorough review. For example, courts have taken a very active part 
274. 435 U.S. at 545. 
275. 450 u.s. 91 (1981). 
276. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) (choice of 
adjudication over rulemaking); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 
203 (1956) (choice of rulemaking over adjudication). 
277. Wright, supra note 49, at 387-88. One concrete example of the problem 
was noted in Yaretsky v. Blum, 629 F.2d 817, 823-24 {2nd Cir. 1980), rev'd, 457 U.S. 
991 (1982). Indeed, agencies themselves are most apt to have too much procedure 
rather than too little, and private attorneys general would perform a great public ser-
vice by bringing cases against agencies which provide too much procedure. 
278. The best judicial effort to distinguish procedural rules from substantive 
rules is Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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in developing procedures for informal adjudication. As Judge Bazelon has ob-
served, judges are experts in, above all else, procedures, and hence they can 
contribute more to procedural development than to any other area of an ad-
ministrative program.279 Thus, while there is need for restraint and comity, 
both doctrine and practicality demand that courts retain the authority to sub-
stitute their procedural judgments for that of the agencies. 
The depth of judicial scrutiny of procedural judgments, and the ability to 
substitute judgment on such issues, raises a further caution. Judge Friendly 
has pointed out that procedural review and substantive review are inter-
twined.280 There may be little difference, for example, between a court sending 
a matter back to the agency because of some procedural defect that resulted in 
inadequate support and sending it back because of the absence of substantial 
evidence. Under any standard of review, the adequacy of support depends on 
the machinery used to develop that support. In many cases, when a court finds 
the machinery inadequate it has also made some judgment about the substan-
tive conclusions. The merging of substantive and procedural review is inevita-
ble, but a sound review system demands that the courts keep the two types of 
review separate to the extent possible. A court should avoid reaching conclu-
sions about procedure when it really disagrees with the substantive judgments. 
This results in distortions in the development of procedural law and it presents 
the danger that the courts will interfere in the substantive decision more than 
was intended. The court is largely free to substitute judgment on procedural 
questions, but it is almost always limited in review of substantive questions. 
The system demands that the court apply the proper level of review to each 
issue and suffers from an effort to expand the review by confusing the two. On 
the other hand, the system needs extensive judicial contribution on procedural 
questions, and it suffers when the court incorrectly restrains itself on those 
issues. 
5. Constitutional Issues 
The APA provides for review of constitutional issues· involved in agency 
action.281 Constitutional review of agency action is an essential part of the 
review system developed in this paper. There is some confusion generated, 
however, by the failure to determine whether the court is reviewing the consti-
tutionality of congressional action or agency action. Review of underlying stat-
utes which are represented by agency action is properly very limited,282 but as 
279. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651-52 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring). 
280. Friendly, supra note 93, at 1313. With the agencies often trying to beat the 
overly active courts to the punch, it is little wonder that we have created procedures 
that are so expansive and unworkable that they may lead to the demise of many sub-
stantive functions because the benefits have been swallowed up by the drain on re-
sources into procedures. 
281. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (1982). 
282. Such review is limited because review of legislation per se is limited. See 
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agency action moves away from a simple manifestation of legislative direction 
towards acting on its own, the constraints on review also lessen. At the point 
where the constitutionality of the agency action can be said to be divorced 
from the constitutionality of its statutory support, the judicial authority be-
comes absolute. At that point, the court is the final arbiter of all constitutional 
questions and is free to substitute judgment. Indeed, unlike questions of law, a 
court probably need not even give deference to any agency constitutional 
determination. 283 
Although courts give little deference to agency constitutional judgments, 
two basic categories of constitutional challenges to agency action are generally 
subject to very slight judicial review. The first, due process, as discussed above, 
often fails to involve the courts in the procedural judgments of the agency, and 
some procedural challenges do not receive much support. The second, the non-
delegation doctrine, also tends to raise little judicial support.284 Although some 
delegations of legislative authority have been struck down in the past,28G and 
some may be successfully attacked in the future,288 most delegations will pass 
judicial examination. Courts are presently inclined to approve almost any dele-
gation.287 To some extent this extreme judicial deference to delegations can be 
explained by the fact that review to prevent improper delegation actually ques-
tions congressional action rather than administrative action; thus, review of 
delegation is properly very limited. 
6. Overview of Issue-directed Standards 
Each administrative decision will involve a mix of different categories of 
issues, and each category involved in that decision may be subjected to differ-
ent standards of review. A court is free to substitute judgment on issues of 
constitutionality, procedure, and law. The level of judicial scrutiny on these 
issues will depend on the deference afforded the administrative judgment, and 
generally Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. RBV. 1 
(1980). 
283. Cf Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 
380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965); Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An 
Essay in Memory of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REv. 263, 299 (1978). 
284. "That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a prin-
ciple universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of 
government ordained by the Constitution." Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). 
"Although, as we shall see in ensuing sections, delegations are often sustained in ab-
sence of statutory statement of standards, the pivot on which judicial opinions usually 
hinge is presence or absence of a legislative standard." 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 81. 
285. L. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 57-72. 
286. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
287. See, e.g .• Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 
(D.D.C. 1971). If review of delegations were converted into review of agency inaction 
through the concept of "required rulemaking" as proposed inK. DAVIS, supra note 91, 
at 56-57, then review could be much more searching. 
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many factors affect that deference.288 The courts are rarely authorized to sub-
stitute judgment on issues of policy or fact, and the level of review on such 
issues is not a question of deference. Questions of policy are usually assigned 
to the agency's judgment or discretion, and courts can inject themselves only 
so far as to ensure against arbitrariness or to guard against abuse of discre-
tion. Questions of fact may be open to several levels of review, usually either 
reasonableness or arbitrariness, and a court must stay within the assigned 
level. When the assignment is not clear, a court can determine whether to 
apply the reasonableness or the arbitrariness standard according to whether 
the factual issue involves adjudicative facts or legislative facts. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Reviewing courts are as responsible as the agencies for the success of the 
administrative process in general and each administrative program in particu-
lar. The judiciary shares the duty to assure that a program provides the maxi-
mum aggregate benefit to all intended recipients of that program and that the 
entire governmental system works to the maximum benefit for all citizens. The 
reviewing courts, however, are not well situtated to answer this duty. Their 
review function is inherently myopic; it forces courts to focus on only isolated 
and usually unrepresentative situations within the total administrative 
program. 
Courts deal with this myopia in several ways. Some try to become instant 
experts so that they can take a broader view than that presented by the indi-
vidual case before them.289 Others replace legislative and administrative judg-
ments with their own dogmas and biases.290 The better judges make the best 
decisions they can in the case before them and concede that they cannot make 
overreaching judgments in the context of individual cases. 
The review system serves this last group and permits them to serve the 
public interest. Through the principles surrounding standards of review and 
unreviewability, the system instructs these judges as to how to approach the 
individual case in a way commensurate with the overall administrative pro-
gram and best calculated to provide optimum government benefits to the ob-
jects of the program and the public as a whole. Through these principles, those 
with the responsibility for establishing a coherent program, the legislature, can 
assign to the courts their place in the program. 
288. These include the elements which make an agency's judgment persuasive: 
thoroughness of consideration, validity of the reasoning, consistency with prior and sub-
sequent pronouncements, agency specialization, legislative reenactment, contemporane-
ous construction of a statute, and longstanding effectiveness. 
289. E.g., Wald, supra note 221, at 153. 
290. E.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 685 F.2d 459, 517 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) ("lfthere was ever a doubt prior to today, it is now 
clear that this court is committed to an assumed role as high public protector of all 
that is good from perceived evils of the nuclear age."), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2246 {1983). 
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I have tried to express the structure and rationality of the review concepts 
the system uses. If this description succeeds, it will enable Congress to better 
instruct the courts and it will guide the courts in finding their role where the 
instructions are not clear or as precise as they should be. All this is ap-
proached from the point of view of allowing the courts and the agencies to 
take advantage of each other's strength, thereby providing the best possible 
service to the public. 
